A Review of the Delivery of the Road Safety Strategy - UCL Report

2: Key aspects of delivery

The road safety strategy sets out a range of policies and types of measures that can contribute to the delivery of the strategy and the achievement of the casualty reduction targets for 2010, together with an implementation timetable including over 150 lines of action. From these the review team has identified for discussion here 14 key aspects which bear particularly directly upon the delivery of casualty reductions and may therefore offer scope for acceleration of delivery.

Three major considerations influence the strength and urgency of the case for taking forward a casualty-reducing policy or measure:

• cost-effectiveness, or performance according to a wider process of appraisal;
• acceptability in the eyes of the affected public, interest groups and key decision makers; and
• availability of financial and human resources or other prerequisites - notably parliamentary time.

Measures for which the resulting reduction in numbers of killed or injured can be estimated are susceptible to analysis of cost-effectiveness in terms of all the costs and benefits for which monetary values can be attributed. Various refinements in the way in which this is done are set out in Appendix 5, but the procedure remains straightforward for measures, such as many low-cost engineering schemes, whose only or overwhelmingly largest effect is casualty reduction. Some measures, such as more extensive engineering schemes, also have appreciable traffic and environmental effects, for some of which monetary values have not been established. Such measures should be subject to a wider appraisal of the kind that is applied to road construction schemes, and of which cost-effectiveness in monetary terms forms a part. For yet other measures, notably for those in the area of education, training and publicity, and for some types of enforcement, the resulting reduction in numbers killed or injured cannot be estimated, and decisions about their implementation are a matter of informed judgement by decision-makers.

Judgement is also needed in relation to acceptability to the public and to interest groups, and decision-makers need to be informed about these aspects of policies and measures, as discussed in Appendix 5.

Delivery of the road safety strategy also has to compete for decision-makers' attention, and also for financial and human resources and sometimes for parliamentary time, with other ways of improving economic efficiency, public health and the quality of life.

Against this background, the 14 key aspects of delivery of the strategy are next discussed, beginning with those where there seems to be greatest scope for acceleration of their implementation and moving on to those where greater difficulties need to be addressed in order to smooth the way to their implementation. The key players in the area of implementation are identified at the end of each section.

2.1 Road safety engineering

Road safety engineering, the physical adaptation of road alignment, layout, signs, markings, equipment and furniture with the objective of reducing risk of death or injury, contributes to at least five of the ten themes of the strategy. It is also highly cost-effective. As argued in more detail in Appendix 5, there is a strong case for investing more resources in local road safety engineering schemes, as it is likely to be a very long time before the scope for cost-effective investment to reduce casualties in this way is reduced to the level that would correspond to dealing with a trickle of new problems arising from year to year in a comprehensively safety-engineered road system.

This point is reinforced by noting that investment of £50 per resident of Gloucester in the Safer City Project (Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR) 2001) was highly cost-effective (with benefits by the end of the 5-year project period valued at about 4 times the sum invested and continuing casualty reduction benefits to be expected in subsequent years), and investment at the same rate for a population of, say, 40 million urban residents would take about 20 years at the current rate of spending on road safety engineering.

On non built-up roads other than motorways, where 53 per cent of deaths and 35 per cent of serious injury on the roads occurred in 2001, mostly to users of motor vehicles, road safety engineering can contribute to speed management on both main roads and country lanes, and on the approaches to villages and towns. Road safety engineering can also help drivers to overtake, negotiate bends and make turning movements with less risk, and reduce the severity of injury when vehicles run off the road.

On built-up roads, where 41 per cent of deaths and 61 per cent of serious injuries occurred in 2001, roughly equally shared between users of motor vehicles, and pedestrians and cyclists, road safety engineering can reduce risk to all kinds of road user on all types of road found in cities, towns and villages.

There is a strong link between vehicle speed in built up areas, the risk of collisions with pedestrians and to the level of injury sustained. By reducing vehicle speeds through the use of packages of urban safety measures, including traffic calming and traffic management, injuries to pedestrians have been reduced. The introduction of 20 miles/h zones has led to a 61 per cent reduction in all casualties and a 70 per cent reduction in child pedestrian casualties in the affected areas (Webster and Mackie 1996). Grayling at al (2002) have demonstrated that children in the ten per cent most deprived wards were more than three times as likely to be pedestrian casualties than counterparts in the ten per cent least deprived wards and recommend that traffic calming and 20 miles/h be the norm in residential areas. But there are still those, including the emergency services, who are not prepared to accept the inconvenience the speed reducing measures cause and have asked to have them removed or are vocally opposed to their introduction at public consultation. This is an area which needs greater understanding and careful handling by local authorities. On the other hand there are groups of residents who have a strong desire for traffic calming but whose local highway authority cannot deliver the schemes through lack of resources, resulting in waiting lists of many years for these highly cost effective schemes.

There is a clear need to encourage the implementation of road safety engineering measures of known cost-effectiveness to consistent design standards, and in order to do this there is a need to increase the capacity of the profession at local level to be able to undertake this work.

More local and central government commitment is needed to increasing the workforce capacity in this area through allocation of funding to recruitment, training, and the development of an identifiable and motivating career structure.

The Highways Agency has a programme of road safety engineering for its network in pursuit of its target and should be encouraged to progress this vigorously, but the bulk of the responsibility for road safety engineering falls upon local authorities.

In terms of their programming of work and allocation of funding to it, it is too early to say how effective the system of Local Transport Plans and associated Annual Progress Reports for allocation of funding from central government is being in delivering road safety engineering on the ground. This must be monitored closely by the DfT along with the implications arising from the recent announcement from the DfT (DfT 2003b) stating that authorities that have been judged 'excellent' by the Audit Commission as part of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment are to be exempt from requirement to submit most plans, including LTPs. More detail is given in Appendix 2.

The commitment of locally elected members to road safety and the casualty reduction targets is important to harness and retain in two ways. The first is for them to resist diverting funds to other policy areas within the local authority and the second to commit an increase in funds to an accelerated rate of implementation of schemes based on criteria of cost-effectiveness in casualty reduction.

If, however, monitoring were to show that road safety is not being adequately delivered on the ground, then the DfT must work urgently with the local government associations to devise and implement a revised funding mechanism which enables local authorities across the country to deliver their part of the strategy in the form of cost-effective road safety engineering programmes.

Delivery of road safety engineering lies with local authorities and the Highways Agency

2.2 Crash protection in cars and car-based light goods vehicles

There has been a general improvement in protection built into cars to reduce injury to occupants in collisions. Broughton (2003) estimates that improved occupant protection reduced the numbers of drivers killed or seriously injured in 1998 by about 20 percent compared with what might have occurred if all cars had had a 1980 level of occupant protection. This is continuing with fresh impetus provided ahead of EU legislation by the consumer information programme EuroNCAP.

In contrast to the achievements of motor manufacturers in providing occupant protection ahead of the requirements of EU legislation, corresponding progress towards improving protection of pedestrians and cyclists struck by cars and car-based light goods vehicles is slow. Motor manufacturers need not wait for legislation to make necessary modifications voluntarily, but in the absence of regulatory pressure, most seem reluctant to make these relatively inexpensive changes. They should be encouraged to do so in the very next round of newly designed or extensively retooled models. This process might be helped by changing the EuroNCAP scoring system so that the best scores could be obtained only by providing protection to pedestrians and cyclists as well as occupants of the car.

Even then the effect by 2010 will be very modest because it takes up to 15 years to replace most of the fleet - but acting now is crucial to substantial progress in the decade after 2010.

Delivery of crash protection is in the hands of the motor manufacturers

2.3 Evidential roadside breath testing

One of the strong points of policy to reduce drink driving in Britain is the strength of enforcement of the alcohol limit. Yet it is widely recognised that the effectiveness of such enforcement in terms of numbers of drivers stopped and tested per hour spent on such work by traffic police cars and their crews is severely constrained by the fact that any driver whose roadside test result is positive has to be taken to a police station for more precise breath testing to provide the evidential basis for prosecution. This time-consuming procedure takes the officers away from roadside testing of other drivers.

The research team understands that the technology to enable evidential breath test to be administered at the roadside is available, but that parliamentary time is needed for legislation for its use. This time should be found urgently and the resulting change in procedure and its purpose should be explained clearly to the public in order to give a fresh downward impetus to the annual number killed or seriously injured in accidents where the driver is above the limit - figures which have been largely static for a decade or so.

Delivery of evidential roadside breath testing lies with the DfT, the Home Office and Parliament

2.4 Penalties specific to traffic offences

The strategy includes a review of penalties for road traffic offences. This began with an interdepartmental consultation (Home Office, DETR and Lord Chancellors Office 2000). The resulting report (Home Office, DfT and Lord Chancellor's Office 2002) made some recommendations that could be implemented without legislation and were acted on quickly, one concerned with community service penalties that was seen as depending on further consideration by the Home Office of wider penalty-related issues and is therefore discussed later in this section, and others concerned with penalties specific to traffic offences, some of which it should be possible to implement more quickly.

One of these is for a graduated system of penalties for speeding, with a higher level of points awarded to those exceeding the limit by a wide margin, thus bringing forward the prospect of disqualification and increasing the deterrent effect. Parliamentary time to legislate for this change should be found urgently, and the change should be explained carefully to the public to make it clear that it is directed at deliberate and substantial exceeding of speed limits.

Early consideration should be given also to the introduction of rehabilitation courses based on sound research into effectiveness as part of penalties for persistent driving offenders by analogy with those for drink driving offenders.

Delivery of revised penalties lies with the DfT, the Home Office and Parliament

2.5 Speed management on rural roads

From the summary Strategy Implementation Report on the Road Safety Strategy issued quarterly by DfT, it is clear that one area where progress is slower than hoped is speed management, particularly on rural roads. Whilst most accidents on rural roads occur on single-carriageway main roads, there is considerable risk to vehicle occupants on country lanes. There is also concern among walkers, cyclists and horse-riders about speeds on country lanes.

There are a number of possible reasons for this slower progress, including the complexity of this area, the number of groups who have an active interest and need to be consulted, and the large amount of public interest it generates. These issues should be reviewed, and if required, further resources provided to enable implementation targets to be met.

Local authorities should develop speed management strategies, but guidance on this from DfT is currently awaited, although guidance is expected shortly on village speed limits. Guidance has been issued (DfT 2003c) on the use on rural roads of vehicle activated signs which illuminate to warn drivers approaching hazards too fast. Notwithstanding these, more effort is needed to find ways to improve safety on the approaches to bends and junctions, and to reduce injudicious overtaking.

With sound speed management strategies based on best practice and consultation with local communities in place, authorities will be able to respond in a proactive manner within their road safety engineering programmes to speed management issues. Coupled with this, local issues that receive undue attention (for instance due to a vocal minority or media interest) will be able to be placed in order of priority against other issues in accordance with such a strategy. This will help free up resources within local authorities which are currently diverted to such matters.

Delivery of guidance on rural speed management lies with the DfT, and delivery of speed management itself with local authorities and the Highways Agency

2.6 Deployment of safety cameras

The new arrangements for funding the use of safety cameras has enabled local partnerships of police, highway authorities, magistrates courts and health professionals to come together to develop automated speed enforcement strategies. The report on the first eight pilot schemes (Gains et al 2003) has shown that cameras, both fixed and mobile, are highly effective in reducing numbers of killed or seriously injured at the sites at which they operate (35 per cent reduction in KSI). The cameras and their associated publicity have also been found to reduce casualties by about 4 per cent in the wider partnership areas (usually a police force area). By the end of 2003 almost all British police forces will have cameras operating in their areas with the potential to contribute a reduction of about 4 per cent to the national number of people KSI.

Deployment of speed cameras by the partnerships is understandably confined to locations where there is a history of speed-related injury accidents. Such locations are of two kinds: those where the problem of excess speed and associated injury accidents is concentrated on a short length of road, and those where it is spread over a long stretch of road or a local area. In the former case, cameras need to be conspicuous to maximise their deterrent effect. In the latter case the area wide deterrent effect can be much enhanced if drivers are warned by way of signs that cameras are operating on the stretch of road or in the area concerned, but have no way of knowing just where the cameras are - that is, the cameras need to be inconspicuous.

In order to retain public acceptance of widespread deployment of cameras in the face of some misunderstanding and adverse treatment by sections of the media, deployment of cameras by partnerships has so far been required to be conspicuous. Greater public understanding and widespread welcoming of camera deployment by local people and local media should soon pave the way to a change in the rules which would allow partnerships to deploy cameras inconspicuously, so that they can be used more effectively in both kinds of relevant location.

However, there may still come a time when the rate of deployment of cameras outpaces the acceptance by the public of their further use. Strategies for enhanced effectiveness of camera deployment should be being developed now so they can be put in place without introduction of substantial further additional cameras once all police forces have rolled out their current programmes.

Delivery of changes in the rules for deployment of cameras lies with the DfT and Home Office in consultation with the Project Board, and delivery of deployment lies with the camera partnerships

2.7 Real time safety advice

There is considerable potential to affect driver behaviour directly in the future through the provision of real time safety advice. Research projects have provided links between motor manufacturers and traffic authorities, with much of this work focussed on the Highways Agency. The full benefits will only be realised if international standards are set for the storage and availability of the relevant data such as speed limits, low bridges or other hazards. There are probably enough results for high level debates to be taking place about a future vision for safe travel using such systems. Although the contribution to casualty reduction before 2010 may well be limited, early first steps are important to enable a substantial contribution in the subsequent decade.

Delivery of progress towards availability of real time safety advice lies in collaboration between the EU, the DfT, motor manufacturers, local authorities and the Highways Agency

2.8 Intelligent speed adaptation

The potential for casualty reduction through behavioural change brought about by intelligent speed adaptation (ISA) is thought to be large and estimates have put it as high as 30 per cent (Carsten 1999). The Government is committed to continuing its research programme in this area and recognises the need to develop a digital road map showing the speed limits. This would need to be kept up to date regularly and reliably. There are still questions to be asked about driver behaviour in response to a device that is capable either of simply advising the driver continually about the local speed limit or of limiting ability to drive above the speed limit, and extensive road-user trials are currently in progress in this country and elsewhere in Europe. A regulatory framework will need to be worked out at EU level but in the meantime such a device could be used at either level of capability on a voluntary basis by drivers when motor manufacturers are able to provide the device and the digital road map is in place. They should be encouraged to do so, and as a contribution to this encouragement, the government should commit itself to a date for availability of the digital speed maps for at least the most densely populated regions of Great Britain.

Delivery of intelligent speed adaptation lies in collaboration between the EU, the DfT, motor manufacturers, local authorities and the Highways Agency

2.9 Enforcement of traffic law

Enforcement of road traffic law is an area of particular sensitivity in terms of public acceptance because enforcement has implications not only for casualty reduction but also for wider relations between the police and the public. The findings in the North Report (Department of Transport and The Home Office 1988) concerning the importance of proportionality of enforcement across the wide range of traffic offences, from minor lapses to manifestly potentially fatal disregard of the law remain highly relevant today. These include the conclusion, so relevant to the current issue of camera deployment in particular and more widely to the scope for use of new technology in enforcement, that the objective of reducing death and injury

"amply justifies the police making use of the best available means within the law to deter and detect offenders . [including] .using the latest technology . [targeted] . as precisely as possible on those most likely to be in breach of the law."

Enforcement of traffic law with the objective of casualty reduction has to take its place with other calls upon police effort and court time in ways influenced strongly by Home Office priorities, and the amount of resource dedicated to traffic policing is therefore limited. The National Policing Plan 2003-2006 (Home Office, 2002) has made clear that road traffic policing has an important role in achieving the Government's road safety targets. The Plan also recognises the link between road traffic offences and other crime. This link has been demonstrated in previous research (e.g. Chenery, Henshaw and Pease 1999), which showed that a third of drivers illegally parked in disabled bays had criminal records, half had committed previous road traffic offences, and a fifth were "of immediate police interest" because of suspected connections with unsolved crime.

The National Policing Plan also states that:

"Forces and authorities should include in their local policing plans targeted and intelligence led strategies for reducing deaths and injuries on the roads and achieving a safe environment for all road users"

but there is no guidance as to what these strategies should include as part of such plans or how performance against the plans is to be monitored. The National Policing Plan should be followed up by such guidance.

In the meantime there is concern in some quarters that the increased use of automatic enforcement has replaced the deployment of officers on the ground. It is suggested that this is having a detrimental effect on the deterrence of other forms of driving offences, such as dangerous driving, which are not necessarily related to speeding or red-light running.

Delivery of enforcement lies with the Home Office and the Chief Constables

2.10 Reducing at-work road casualties

As envisaged in the strategy, a task group established jointly by the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and DTLR. The Work-related Road Safety Task Group, has examined the issue of casualties in road traffic accidents in which one or more of those involved was at work. It has not hitherto been the remit of the HSC or its Executive, the HSE, to address such accidents in the way it does accidents in the workplace, and information about their number has not previously been collected.

The report of the Task Group, the Dykes Report (HSC and DTLR 2001) estimates that up to a third of all road traffic accidents involve someone who is at work at the time, which may account for over 20 deaths and 250 people seriously injured each week. It accepts the principle that the vehicle may be considered a mobile workplace, but the practical implications of this will take time and resources for the HSE and employers to work out.

The report makes a number of recommendations, including a key proposal to apply existing health and safety law to on-the-road work activities so that employers should manage risk on the road in the same way as they manage other occupational health and safety risks. Guidance is due shortly from the HSE to assist employers in doing so. There will be costs to employers in incorporating the guidance into their health and safety management systems, but also savings in days lost from work and vehicle repair costs if their employees are involved in fewer road traffic accidents. Another recommendation is that journey purpose be collected as part of the national road accident data STATS19, and this is likely to be recommended as part of the current review of STATS19, leading to fuller information about the problem on a national basis from 2005.

The HSCand HSE are developing a prioritised programme of work for the coming 2-3 years, and the Occupational Road Safety Alliance, comprising a steering group of 24 relevant organisations has been formed to promote action by employers. It is important that momentum is maintained or increased by all concerned.

Delivery of reductions in at-work road casualties lies with employers and the HSE

2.11 Single/double summertime

The adoption of single/double summertime (i.e. advancing the clocks by one hour throughout the year, thus bringing Britain into the same time zone as most of the rest of the EU) is a cross-departmental matter, in which road safety in only one of many considerations. It has been estimated (Broughton and Stone 1998) that it would have saved an average of 100 lives per year in the period 1991-94, which implies about 80 lives a year now. This is because more death and injury would be prevented in the hour made light in the afternoon or evening than would be caused in the hour made dark in the morning. More than half of these would be pedestrians. The DfT should therefore be continually on the alert with other supportive departments for an opportunity to have this change considered once again, and support it wholeheartedly when such an opportunity arises.

Delivery of single/double summertime is a cross-departmental issue needing to be taken to Parliament

2.12 Reduction of the blood alcohol limit to 50mg/100ml

In 1998 the Government issued a consultation paper Combating Drink Driving: Next Steps,(DETR 1998b) there is a strong statement to the effect that:

"The Government is minded to make it an offence to drive with a blood alcohol limit of 50 mg or over...." (para 39).

The DETR published a summary of the public response to the Government's proposals in April 2000 but it has not published its response to this consultation paper, giving instead its response through an answer to a Written Parliamentary Question on 20 March 2002, in which it was stated that there are no plans to make a change from 80 mg in the forseeable future. This limited response has made it difficult to judge what has held the government back from making a change that is estimated to save about 50 lives per year.

The argument has been rejected by Government that a lower level should be adopted in the light of the EU recommendation for a limit not exceeding 50 mg by saying that in the UK there is more stringent enforcement of laws, and there are higher penalties.

"Applying our penalties at 50 mg would put us further out of line with Europe in terms of sanctions. It is also likely that that would be regarded as unduly harsh".(The United Kingdom Parliament 2003)

But there would be no need to apply the existing penalties of disqualification at 50 mg. A suspended sentence of disqualification could be imposed which would be brought into effect by a second conviction within 10 years for exceeding 50 mg.

This measure should be reconsidered after a reasonable interval, perhaps when forthcoming new evidence from the USA about the effect of lower levels of alcohol on accident involvement becomes available.

Delivery of the reduced blood alcohol limit lies with the DfT and Parliament

2.13 Encouragement of wearing of cycle helmets

It is widely recognised that the level of public acceptance in still too low, and the views promoted by cycling groups too hostile, for the wearing of cycle helmets to be made mandatory. The debate about helmet wearing has become highly polarised (Towner et al 2003). Advocates of helmet wearing base their argument overwhelmingly on the evidence that in the event of a fall, helmets substantially reduce head injury. Those against helmet wearing base their argument on a wider range of issues including the assertions that compulsory helmet wearing would lead to a decline in cycling and loss of benefits to health, that risk compensation negates the injury reducing effect, that scientific studies are defective and that the road environment needs to be improved. There is a clear need for this debate to be defused and clarified so that an agreed basis can be found for strong promotion of helmet wearing by choice.

This exemplifies the fact that some interest groups hold positions that lead to resistance to the introduction of safety measures known to be successful. Ways need to be sought to engage these groups to identify their motivations in operating levers that they hold, and additionally to identify decision makers' perceptions of these mechanisms.

Delivery of stronger encouragement of wearing of cycle helmets lies with the DfT, local authorities and cycling groups

2.14 Extension of community sentences to non-imprisonable traffic offences

There is a wide range of traffic offences, some of them potentially serious, for which the penalty available to the court is a fine without the option of imprisonment. There are many motoring offenders for whom fines set at the levels normally imposed, or even the maximum fines, are little deterrent, and for whom suitable community sentences might well be a substantially greater deterrent.

The use of such sentences for non-imprisonable offences is recognised to be a substantial departure from past practice which has implications, including resource implications for the Home Office which go beyond the area of traffic offences. Nevertheless, the potential values of such penalties in dealing with traffic offenders should be pursued strongly with the Home Office with a view to achieving their availability sooner rather than later.

Delivery of community sentences for non-imprisonable traffic offences lies with the Home Office, the DfT and Parliament

2.15 Concluding remarks

The key aspects discussed in Sections 2.1-2.14 are those which the review team has identified as bearing particularly directly upon the delivery of casualty reductions. This is in no way to suggest that other aspects of the road safety strategy are unimportant. On the contrary, the strategy is a balanced one based on extensive research and wide consultation, and which needs to be pursued as a whole if the casualty reduction targets are to be met.

Nevertheless, renewed vigour brought to bear upon progressing the foregoing policies and measures offers scope for appreciable acceleration in the delivery of the strategy and renewed encouragement to all stakeholders to think not just in terms of how to achieve the targets for 2010, but by how much they can be exceeded.

At the ministerial and parliamentary level the challenge to government is to be ready where necessary to move as far ahead of relevant opinion as it can carry the affected people and interest groups with it.

At the local level, the challenge to responsible elected members, and especially to portfolio holders, is to set their sights upon the real prospect of substantial casualty reductions through well directed evidence-based effort, and where necessary to resist pressure to divert resources to schemes for which there is local pressure but from which little or no casualty reduction can be expected.

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