3.1

Overview of Strategies

3.1.1

Each of the cities has experienced growth in the demand for travel through a combination of rising populations, suburbanisation, economic success and other factors. The challenge has been how to accommodate this growth which is becoming increasingly disparate and more difficult to meet with cost-effective public transport.

3.1.2

Most of the cities have come to the view that investing in more roads is no longer feasible as available land is limited, there is concern over environmental impacts and most authorities accept that increasing road space will generate additional traffic. Only Moscow and Tokyo have significant road construction programmes. Moscow arguably has an under-provision of roads and the city authority wants an outer ring road to reduce through traffic and open up land for development, even though it accepts that this will not address the growing problem of congestion caused by the rapid motorisation and lack of investment in alternatives to the car. In Tokyo, additional orbital roads form part of a land use strategy to develop rings of suburban cities that are also served by high quality rail links (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 – Tokyo Land Use Plan

3.1.3

Generally there is an emphasis on policies to rationalise the allocation of road space between different users, reduce further traffic growth and support measures that are aimed at reducing car use. The measures that have been implemented in both the large and medium sized cities tend to fall into four main categories:

• Land use policies;

• Improvements to public transport, walking and cycling;

• Traffic restraint – for example, through parking policies, regulatory or physical restrictions on the types of vehicles allowed to use certain roads, and congestion charging; and

• ‘Soft’ policies such as ticketing initiatives, car clubs and awareness campaigns to encourage people to try alternative modes of travel.

3.1.4

The cities’ strategies are made up of elements from each of these categories, though the balance of ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ varies.

3.2

Land Use Policies

3.2.1

Regulating land use through the location, type, size and density of development can help to reduce the need to travel, particularly by car. Singapore’s integrated transport and land use strategy has sought to decentralise development to regional and sub-regional centres that are served by mass rapid transit (MRT). These centres have high density, mixed development types to reduce the need to use a car and, with the controls on car ownership and congestion charging, this has worked. People typically travel 2,400km a year by car, compared to 4,200km in London and 8,000km in New York, and public transport use has been rising with services busy both to and from the new centres (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2 – Public Transport Use

Note: Data for London precedes the Mayors’ Transport Strategy.

Source: Kenworthy and Laube, 1999 and 2001

3.2.2

The strategy is set out in the Concept Plan and more detailed Development Plans which specify exactly how land is to be used to avoid ad-hoc decision-making which has undermined transport strategies in cities such as Dublin and Madrid. These reflect an important change in approach as the first MRT lines were built without sufficiently high development densities to ensure a cost-efficient level of transit use.

3.2.3

Barcelona and Tokyo have also gone some way to ensuring that development occurs in areas that are served by rail and it is these three cities that now have the lowest reliance on subsidy for public transport.

3.2.5

For the past two decades planning policies in Tokyo have favoured polycentric development through the growth of suburban cities and sub-centres to take the pressure off the CBD. Nearly 3,000km of rail lines have been built by the public and private sector often using finance from increased land values around stations, and whilst journey lengths are long (10.8km), about 30% of all journeys are made by public transport.

3.2.6

Land use policies are also being implemented in lower density cities. For example, Perth has a policy of ‘urban consolidation’ that includes new design codes that encourage greater clustering and enable people to walk to more places, and high density developments centred on inner city rail stations. It is too soon to say whether they have had any effect on car use, but without these policies much more land would have been developed on the urban fringe and greater investment would have been needed in essential infrastructure.

3.3

Improvements to Alternative Modes

3.3.1

All of the cities have been investing in improvements to public transport to provide an alternative to the car and these have led to increases in patronage. For example, over the past 15 years, Madrid has invested in the electrification of the 12 suburban rail lines, rolling stock renewal that has improved punctuality from 92% to 99%, increasing the metro system by 115km (see right), and extending the urban bus network by 10% with associated upgrading in vehicles and stops. With the introduction of simplified integrated ticketing, these policies have successfully reversed the decline in public transport use. Total patronage has almost doubled, through population growth and a rise in the number of passenger journeys per resident (trip rate) which has been increasing at 2.1% per year.

3.3.2

New York has been able to bring about an even greater increase in the public transport trip rate (3.8% per year). The city has invested over US$48 billion (approx £25bn) in restoring and upgrading the city’s decrepit rail and subway systems. The efforts to “save public transport” (as the campaign became known) have included restoring the track, rolling stock and much of the behind the scenes infrastructure such as signals and the power system which have resulted in significant improvements in reliability (for example, on-time performance has increased from 85% to 93.1% on the Long Island Rail Road and from 80.5% to 97.5% on the Metro-North Railroad). The refurbishment of 356 stations and zero-tolerance approach to graffiti has also reduced crime and improved people’s sense of security which has further increased usage.

3.3.3

The greatest increases on public transport have been in the cities that have active restraints on car use such as London (where the public transport trip rate has risen by 3.8%pa since the mid 90s) and Singapore (4.4% in the past year). These cities also have relatively competitive public transport speeds partly because of the investment in bus priority measures.

3.3.4

Without these factors, continued investment is likely to generate diminishing returns as the comfort and convenience associated with the car means that it will always be more attractive than public modes.

3.3.5

Cities do not have to spend significant amounts on improvements to see notable change. In addition to the two light rail lines, Dublin has implemented a relatively modest programme of Quality Bus Corridors (QBCs). The nine routes have high frequency services running in bus lanes, with priority measures at junctions, new shelters and better pedestrian links to stops. There are now 195,000 passengers a day and the car mode share has fallen by 18% on one route into the city centre where extensive on-street parking controls have been implemented.

3.3.6

Nottingham has developed a comprehensive three-tier bus network and invested in bus lanes and other measures to improve take-up. High frequency ‘Go2’ buses now operate on 14 major corridors, mainstream services operate every 20-30 minutes in residential areas and subsidised socially-necessary buses fill any gaps in coverage. The city has been able to reverse the trend of declining bus use and has registered increases in patronage of 8% per year prior to the introduction of the Nottingham Express Transit system which has fuelled further public transport use. Nottingham is consistently ranked in the top five most successful retail locations in the UK. Part of its success has been the compact urban form; it has successfully resisted out of town development and kept land use density high to support mass transit and also increase the feasibility of walking and cycling. Non-motorised travel now accounts for 25% of all journeys.

3.3.7

Cities have also been improving conditions for walking. Significant progress has been made in Barcelona which has increased its pedestrianised area from 97ha to 110ha since the mid-90s and helped to retain a 36% modal share, and Madrid which has an ambitious Accessibility Plan that includes a 1.5km pedestrian link across the city centre and removing on-street parking to create wider pavements and retain its 38% modal share, compared to about 22% in London.

3.3.8

However, only Paris and Rome have been able to increase the share of journeys made on foot in contrast to the general trend of declining walking levels.

3.3.9

In Paris this has risen slightly to 34% as several major city streets have been ‘civilised’ by re-allocating road space to segregated bus and cycle lanes and wider footpaths. There has also been an extensive ‘Quartiers Verts’ programme which has seen neighbourhoods treated with various traffic calming measures including road narrowings, lower speed limits (down to 30kph from 50kph) and road humps to reduce through traffic. With the parallel investment public transport (including the construction of the fifth RER line, a circular tram/bus line running just outside the Périphérique, a 14th metro line (Météor), these policies reflect a departure from previous policies that attempted to ‘adapt Paris to the car’ that were in place just 10 years ago.

3.3.10

In Rome, the increase in walking is due to the restricted access zone (ZTL) which has reduced traffic in the historic city centre, the removal of car parking from city streets and road closures in tourist areas.

3.3.11

London has shown the greatest progress with increasing cycling; there has been a 23% increase between 2003 and 2004 on main roads (managed by TfL) and a comparable 19% increase on Borough roads. This increase is largely due to the improved road conditions due to increased investment in cycling measures including over 100km of links, nearly 3,000 additional cycle parking spaces (on-street, at stations and at schools) and free training across London.

3.4

Traffic Restraint

Parking Policies

3.4.1

Parking is an important influence in modal choice and most of the cities have strategies that include measures to limit the supply of parking spaces, charge for their use, or policies that cover both supply and tariffs, particularly to deter long-stay commuter parking.

3.4.2

Benchmarking provision in the CBD, where space is at a premium, is a good indicator of the city’s commitment to traffic restraint. In the sample of 14 cities, New York and London have the most limited supply (Table 3.1), coupled with high charges and effective enforcement. These measures have been in place for some time and so it is difficult to gauge their effect.

Table 3.1 – Parking Supply in CBD (spaces per 1,000 jobs)

Source: Kenworthy and Laube, 1999 and 2001

3.4.3

Most cities have been reducing their supply or at least relocating spaces to park and ride sites. For example, Paris now has very little provision for visitors in the Ville de Paris and most of the spaces are dedicated for resident use or under contract to particular businesses. Car ownership is high, but car use is relatively low as residents are reluctant to drive because of the difficulties in finding a space.

3.4.4

Zurich reduced its parking supply through the 80s and 90s. It halved the maximum number of spaces permitted at new developments and introduced controversial restrictions on the use of existing public parking spaces to capitalise on its investment in public transport. As Zurich is a compact city, many residents were able to take a tram or bus, or walk or cycle to their destination and the car mode share fell to about 28% - one of the lowest levels in the world.

3.4.5

Only Perth has introduced a workplace parking levy – though this is being considered in Nottingham. The charge applies to businesses with more than five parking spaces in the CBD, and is currently about £62 a year. The revenue funds the free central bus service.

Regulatory Restrictions and Charging

3.4.6

Just Barcelona, London, Rome and Singapore have actively addressed the problem of growing traffic with measures that directly affect car use, rather than relying on land use policies, rising congestion and improvements to alternative modes to encourage people out of their cars over a period of time.

3.4.7

These are the only cities in the sample that have been able to achieve a reduction in car use that is reflected in the modal shares across a wide area (either the city centre or the entire metropolitan area). The decline in car dominance has led to a notable switch to public transport and generated additional benefits including improvements in air quality and the creation of a revenue stream for further investment in transport.

3.4.8

London is a great success story; since 2000, and reinforced by the introduction of congestion charging in 2003, the car mode share has fallen by 5% (mostly because of a switch to bus), traffic has dropped by 18%, resulting in 65,000 fewer car trips, and congestion has decreased by 30%. Bus routes in the charging zone face 60% less delays.

3.4.9

Some 50-60% of the former car users have transferred to public transport though patronage was already rising on the city’s greatly improved bus network. The network has been expanded and new routes introduced so that 90% of all households are now within 400 metres of a bus service. Service levels are higher than at any time since 1957 and reliability has also improved; scheduled kilometers operated has risen to 99% in 2003/04, the average wait for high frequency services has reduced and the proportion of low frequency services arriving on time has increased to 75%. As a result, London Buses now carry 1.7billion passengers – the highest number since 1968.

3.4.10

Whilst it has been controversial, the charge has been effective and has not resulted in substantially higher flows on perimeter routes or adverse impacts on the economy. It has also created a revenue stream (estimated at £1.3bn over 10 years of operation) for further investment and support for transport improvements in London.

3.4.11

The congestion charging scheme in Singapore was also successful in reducing traffic originally, but the aims of this scheme are now slightly different. The charge varies to balance the supply and demand for road space throughout the day and this has enabled traffic levels to rise outside peak periods.

3.4.12

The original Area Licence introduced in 1975 required drivers to purchase a permit from roadside booths, post offices, and various other outlets to drive in the CBD in the peak. The initial S$3 (approximately £1) per day charge was immediately successful in reducing traffic entering the CBD by 40% and increasing the average speeds from 23 kph to 30 kph . The charging zone was subsequently enlarged to include the surrounding expressways and the controls extended to all-day operation.

3.4.13

The Area Licence was replaced in 1998 by an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) scheme that allows greater flexibility in setting charges and deducting payments. Drivers are now charged each time they enter the charging zone and charges are adjusted if speeds fall outside the accepted 20-30kph range in the CBD and 45-65kph on the expressways. Payment is made from a stored value card located in an in-car unit as the vehicle passes under an overhead gantry. Whilst the ERP charge is typically lower than the permit, the switch to pay per entry has led to a further 15% drop in entry flows.

3.4.14

Outside the charging area, there has been a small increase in traffic mainly because of development of sub-regional centres. This growth has been limited by the controls on car ownership, integrated transport and land use planning and extensions to the mass transit system.

3.4.15

Some cities consider charging to be unsuitable and there have been some notable results from strategies that include access controls. Since 1999, Barcelona has seen private transport (cars and powered two-wheelers) fall by 8% within the inner city and by 4% between the inner city and the suburbs. This has been achieved through a combination of:

• Restrictions on car use in certain neighbourhoods, removal of car parking and the reallocation of road space to pedestrians;

• Investment in public transport (modernising suburban rail, a 5km extension to the metro and two new tramways and a 20% increase in bus kilometres); and

• Integrated fares and ticketing which has led to a three-fold increase in public transport journeys involving two or more modes/services.

3.4.16

Five restricted access zones have been introduced in environmentally sensitive areas. These have access gates that limit entry to authorised vehicles (residents, doctors and emergency vehicles) which are equipped with in-vehicle transponders. Within the zones, the speed limit is just 10kph and priority is given to pedestrians and bicycles. Surveys conducted in the first zone, La Ribera, show that the traffic entering the zone has fallen by 78%. Residents are pleased with the scheme and the impacts on the economy are generally positive.

3.4.17

The investment in public transport has been high; Barcelona has been consistently spending 2% of its GDP on transport. But it has led to a considerable increase in patronage, partly through the combination of the existing mix of people and jobs, extremely high land use density in the city and policies that focus new development in the urban area or on sites served by rail. Proximity to a sufficiently large number of potential users has helped to improve the financial viability of public transport and the cost recovery of suburban rail is 71% and metro/urban bus 79%, compared to about 50% for most European cities.

3.4.18

The introduction of a similar restricted access zone (ZTL) has been the central policy in Rome’s strategy to address congestion and dangerously high air pollution. The concept met with a great deal of public opposition, which was overcome with the conviction of the political champions, extensive consultation and evidence of air quality improvements in the pilot areas.

3.4.19

The original ZTL began in 1989 and covered the historic centre (an area of 4.6km2 containing 42,000 residents and 10% of the city’s jobs). It was effective in removing 8-10% of cars during the restricted hours (0630-1800 weekdays and 1400-1800 on Saturdays), but has been replaced by an electronic system (IRIDE) with tighter controls on eligibility, charges for non-resident permits and a high level of enforcement.

3.4.20

IRIDE led to a further 20% fall in traffic in the centre with some transfer to the city’s much improved public transport system and an increase in the use of powered two-wheelers. There has been little change in traffic levels outside the restricted area and two further zones have since been implemented in the Trastevere and San Lorenzo neighbourhoods.

3.4.21

After the initial controversy, the ZTL has gained support from the public. A recent sample-based survey showed that 75% of residents thought that electronic access control was a good idea, 67.2% felt it would contribute to improving the quality of the air and 64.7% felt that it would contribute to increasing the use of public transport.

3.5

Soft Policies

3.5.1

‘Softer’ policy options such as public transport fares initiatives and better travel information are being pursued across all of the cities. The simplification of fares structures and introduction of multi-ride tickets allowing free transfer between modes have been successful in making public transport easier to use and have resulted in increased patronage.

3.5.2

Nottingham is one of the best examples of a city where a number of policies have been brought together under a comprehensive and effective strategy. The city’s land use policies have resisted sprawl, there has been investment in a tram system and local bus services with priority over general traffic, restraints on car use mainly through pedestrianisation and parking policies. These policies have been supported by numerous ‘soft’ initiatives as shown in Figure 3.4. The strategy has led to a 3% decline in car mode share since the mid-90s and halted traffic growth, in contrast to the trend seen in other UK metropolitan areas (outside London).

Figure 3.4 Nottingham Transport Strategy

3.5.3

Other medium sized cities are also pursuing various soft policies such as car clubs and car sharing schemes, but they need more time or expansion over a larger area before they can be shown to be effective in reducing traffic across the city.

3.5.4

The level of fares is also a policy lever that is used by some cities. Generally public transport fares are higher in London and New York, and particularly low in Barcelona and Madrid, but the cost recovery ratios (fare revenue as a percentage of operating cost) varies significantly from over 100% in Tokyo (private operators) and Singapore, to 55% in London and many of the large European cities to 20% in Zurich.

3.5.5

There are various examples of new information systems including Visulys in Lyon and most cities now have some form of real-time information available at interchanges and to a lesser extent at stops. There is an assumption that when transport systems are improved people will automatically use them, but there is a lot of inertia in travel behaviour and a lack of knowledge about alternative modes. Perth has coupled information provision with a public education campaign (TravelSmart – see panel) that has been effective in changing travel patterns and is now also being implemented in Nottingham.