Reports:

Transport and climate change - CfIT response to Defra consultation

Section 3: Which existing policies are working well? How might they be further improved?

Summary

Surface passenger transport Technology Euro standard voluntary agreement has allowed steady progress to be made in the fuel efficiency of new cars sold. However, it has taken six years to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 17.7g/km and expectations for savings in the UK were overoptimistic, due to economic growth and higher than expected demand for larger cars (although the car market has been characterised by growth at both ends of the CO2 emitting scale. The voluntary agreement could be combined with further fiscal measures to stimulate greater consumer demand for very fuel efficient car technologies such as hybrid-electric. The UK has already taken a number of steps to promote the uptake of biofuels and hybrids and to stimulate the market. However, uptake has been limited, partly due to a lack of support for manufacturers who anticipate that hydrogen fuel cell technology will be the power source of choice in the medium to long term. High capital and unit costs have also limited the uptake of biofuel sales and hybrid costs. There is great potential for Hydrogen and fuel cells to cut emissions, but there are a number of significant technical barriers which must be overcome before an economically viable technology can be brought to the market. The CO2 efficiency gains possible with conventional engines could well outperform fuel cells for several decades. With current vehicle fleet and load factors, average emissions per passenger kilometre for passenger transport modes, especially bus, are not necessarily better than those for multi-occupancy fuel efficient cars. However there is potential for substantial energy and emissions savings from buses in the medium to long term through the adoption of CNG/LNG power, hybrid electric and hydrogen fuel technology. However, this is not a low cost option for the bus industry and could require changes to the current subsidy and grant regime to incentivise the uptake of these technologies in the bus fleet. Fiscal measures Since the abolition of the fuel duty escalator, the Government has had no fiscal lever to control demand for road use. While the UK was the first country in Europe to introduce the Graduated Vehicle Excise Duty, evidence suggests that the initiative has not had a huge influence on customer choice in terms of increasing purchases of low emission vehicles. Hence, the differentials between the VED bands could be widened to encourage more rapid changes in the car buying market. The reformed company car tax regime has been more effective than graduated VED in encouraging the purchase of cleaner cars, although the increasing popularity of 'cash for car' schemes could undermine progress. Transport Grant programmes provide grants for scrapping vehicles that fail emission tests and for conversion to LPG. These schemes have been successful at the 'margins', saving 34,210 tonnes of CO2 emissions in the last two years. Freight The pace of fuel efficiency improvements is likely to be much slower for HGVs compared to cars. While average CO2 emissions per kilometre travelled by an articulated lorry has improved, lighter payloads have resulted in a decline in CO2 emissions per tonne kilometre hauled. Incentives are required to encourage road haulage companies to run low emission fleets and adopt more efficient operating practices. Aviation Technology Reducing emissions from aviation through improvements in engine and airframe technology is consistent with greater economic competitiveness. However, long lead-in times from research and long in-service lifetimes mean that technological advances are not sufficient in themselves to prevent a net increase in emissions associated with increasing demand for air travel. Fiscal measures The inclusion of CO2 from aviation in an emissions trading scheme should produce a saving in greenhouse gases, while allowing the industry to grow. The amount of carbon saved will depend on the agreed cap for the air transport sector. However, there is currently no provision for including other global warming emissions such as including NOx, contrails, etc. There are also doubts over the ability of an aviation emission trading market to work in practice. Other measures: 'green flight' There is potential to reduce emissions further through operational measures such as air and ground traffic efficiency savings and routing flights to avoid environmentally sensitive parts of the atmosphere. More research is needed on the latter in particular.

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Targets for emissions reduction from transport need to be achieved with the minimum negative impact on other objectives and the right balance of social, economic, and environmental outcomes. As a result of this, reducing greenhouse gas emissions from this sector has proved relatively difficult compared with other sectors. However, it is important to assess the contribution of individual sectors of the economy in the light of these objectives and to establish the role of transport in achieving reduction targets.

3.1.2 The structure of the transport market can be divided into three policy areas:

• Surface Passenger Transport;
• Freight; and
• Aviation

3.1.3 Within each of these sectors, mitigating transport's contribution to climate change will require a combination of measures utilising voluntary, market based and regulatory instruments. Climate change policy may be divided into three main policy areas:

• Technical - increasing the efficiency of road and public transport vehicles so they use less fuel per passenger km or tonne km as well as influencing the carbon content of the fuel
• Fiscal - incentives and disincentives to carbon poor/ intensive technology and behaviour
• Other Non-Technical - measures to transfer passengers from high consumption to low consumption modes and to reduce the overall amount of personal travel and movement of goods

3.1.4 This section will concentrate on the first two of these policy areas as their constituent polices have generally been purposefully introduced to target the implications of transport on climate change. As a result, this is not an exhaustive review and does not imply that demand management policies to provide better quality alternatives to the car are less valid than the more technological solutions to tackle climate change. Some of these latter polices are discussed in the final two sections of this report.

3.1.5 This section will take each of the policy areas in turn (passenger surface transport, freight, aviation), discuss existing policies that are working well in respect to emission reduction and offer advice as to their improvement. A summary of the measures considered is as follows:

Table 1: Policies considered in this section

	Surface passenger transport	Freight	Aviation
Technology	* EU Voluntary Agreement * Biofuels and hybrids * Fuel cells and hydrogen * Energy efficiency in alternative modes	* Voluntary agreements on LGVs and HGVs	* Engine and airframe development
Fiscal	* Fuel Duty incentives * Vehicle Excise Duty * Company car tax * Transport Grant programmes		* Emissions trading
Other non-technology		* Sustainable distribution * Rail freight	* Operational efficiency improvements ('green flight')

3.2 Surface passenger transport

(i) Technology

The Voluntary Agreement (VA)
3.2.1 The main mechanisms for encouraging the design of cleaner cars operate at the European level, through the Euro Standards to reduce local air pollutants, and the Voluntary Agreements to reduce carbon dioxide. The European Commission and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association reached an agreement in July 1998 that committed manufacturers to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions from new passenger cars by over 25%, to an average carbon dioxide emission figure of 140 g/km by 2008. In addition, The Powering Future Vehicles strategy was complementary to the UK Energy White Paper and contained a target that by 2012, 10 per cent of all new car sales will be cars emitting 100g/km carbon dioxide or less at the tailpipe.

3.2.2 In 2003 a new car on average emitted 172.1 grammes of carbon dioxide per km^[25]. The Table below shows the success to date in reducing carbon dioxide emissions from new cars.

Table 2: Average new car carbon dioxide emissions in the UK 1997-2003

Year	Average carbon dioxide g/km	y/y % change	% Change on 1997
1997	189.8	-	-%
1998	188.4	-0.70%	-
1999	185.0	-1.80%	-0.70%
2000	181.0	-2.20%	-2.50%
2001	177.6	-1.90%	-4.60%
2002	174.2	-1.90%	-6.40%
2003	172.1	-1.20%	-9.30%

Source: SMMT UK New Car Registrations by CO₂ performance, 2004.

3.2.3 The Voluntary Agreement has allowed steady progress to be made in the fuel efficiency of new cars sold. It demonstrates that soft intervention, and the threat of regulation, can play an important role in encouraging car manufacturers to invest in more fuel efficiency technologies and lighter weight designs^[26].

3.2.4 However, as the table above shows, it has taken six years to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 17.7g/km and only four years remain to reduce carbon dioxide by a further 32 g/km in order to fulfil the agreement. The original expectations for savings in the UK were overoptimistic. The Transport Select Committee^[27] was told that the original expectations were for a reduction of between 2.6 and 5.9 million tons of carbon (MtC) and a figure in the Transport White Paper and the Energy White Paper^[28], was given as 4MtC by 2010. Savings of closer to 2.6 MtC are now expected.

3.2.5 This is echoed in the Climate Change review which claims a total saving from all transport policies (Voluntary Agreements, 10YP, Sustainable Distribution and Off Road Programmes) of 4.42 MtC^[29]. Further improvements are forecast in the UK average figure by 2008, although on current progress it is unlikely that the UK itself will reach the 140g/km figure by that date. Indeed, the recent DfT paper for the Motorists forum bases its figures on reaching an average new car CO₂ emission figure of 152g/km in 2008. They also assume further reductions in fuel consumption thereafter of about 1.5% p.a. reflecting the strong liklihood that a further voluntary agreement will be agreed. The DfT claim that this is a conservative figure as 'the rate of improvement necessary to meet the current VA is somewhat above this'. However, as can be seen from the above table, some years, including 2003, did not witness a 1.5% reduction suggesting that such a rate of improvement is by no means guaranteed.

3.2.6 Progress in the UK has been slightly slower than the EU average for a number of reasons. The UK car market has traditionally been weighted towards larger vehicles, and the UK baseline figure for 1995 was higher than the EU average. In the intervening period, the UK has experienced considerable economic growth, as a result of which consumers have been able to afford generally larger, less efficient vehicles.

3.2.7 There is a political expectation that a target of 120 g/km of CO₂ could be reached for the average new car fleet early in the next decade and a more ambitious target for new car fleet average in 2020 of 100g/km. However, vehicle manufacturers warn that the Commission's political goal of achieving average new passenger car CO₂ emissions of 120g/km by 2012 is unsustainable. They argue that it would require a rapid increase in reductions between 2008 and 2012 which would have a negative impact on the industry leading to lower employment levels and higher vehicle cost.

3.2.8 In light of this, it may seem futile to encourage the government to push for even more ambitious targets for a second VA beyond the current 2008 target. However, a long term framework and effective mechanism post-2008 is needed that can drive standards down even further. Quantitative targets must be ambitious enough to have an impact on the sectors' behaviour. They should go beyond business as usual so they can affect future investment decisions and spurt technological development. As the WWF stated: 'The starting point for negotiations should be how great the GHGs emissions reductions needs to be delivered by the agreement, and not how much industry thinks it can or wants to deliver'^[30].

In order to work towards an effective second VA, the following measures are deemed necessary:

Car manufacturers are under no legal obligation to adhere to the emissions standards and the rate of efficiency improvements in the UK is not on target to meet the EU agreement. The option of introducing statutory obligations needs to be kept open. There are no targets set at a national level for individual member states. Such targets should be considered. The VA needs to be combined with further fiscal measures to stimulate greater consumer demand for very fuel efficient car technologies such as hybrid-electric cars. Greater differentials between vehicle excise duty bands, fuel duty differentials for alternative fuels and continued public awareness programmes including a comprehensive car labelling scheme are some suggested measures. The VA only refers to average emissions from new cars and figures showing the improvement in fuel efficiency are often only for this proportion of the car fleet. There are no targets for light and heavy duty vehicles. A major stumbling block is that there is no requirement to even measure the CO2 emissions from vans in the same way there is for cars. The government should press for legislation requiring measurement and reporting of fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from LGVs and buses. Environmental groups strongly argue that target levels of an extended VA should be set at a level which helps Member States and the EU to meet their overall GHG reduction targets. Reference is made to the UK's target for reducing CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050. With a future increase in market penetration of biomass based fuels and hydrogen, there is a strong case for considering reformatting future agreements on the basis of well-to-wheel (W-T-W) emissions. A target based on tailpipe emissions could risk providing perverse incentives to increase W-T-W emissions. Future agreements could incentivise and account upstream for the use of alternative fuels. This could be reflected in subsequent agreements in the carbon content of the fuels, assuming a European average carbon intensity for the fuel based on accurate, transparent and robust assessments. The robustness of the agreements as climate change policy instruments is seen at risk if numerous accessories curb increasing vehicle efficiency. Some think the European drive cycle should reflect as closely as possible actual use on the road and therefore should include the use of mobile air conditioning and other equipment. Achieving a target of 120g/km of CO2 would require a greater proportion of new car sales to be smaller, lighter weight diesel models. It may also require greater uptake of very fuel efficient, new car technologies such as hybrid-electric cars. However, low carbon cars are already available on the market but people are generally not choosing to buy them. Encouraging the development and manufacture of further niche vehicles which are low carbon but only purchased by a small minority will not generate a mass move to low carbon cars across the market. Therefore, there is a need to understand consumer choice and encourage purchasing of these vehicles through measures such as consumer information and education, tax incentives and purchase grants, car labelling and the development of mass market hybrid-electric cars.

Future fuels and technologies
3.2.9 As well as more efficient engines, the Energy White Paper (2003) suggested that if deep carbon reductions were to be delivered from the transport sector, low carbon fuels, including biofuels and renewably produced hydrogen, would have an important role to play. Realistically, petrol and diesel will continue to power the majority of the UK passenger car fleet in the short-to medium term at least. However, there is evidence to suggest that the vehicle technologies and fuels of the future offer the potential for very low and even zero-emissions, both at the tail pipe and in the production and distribution of the fuel.

Biofuels and hybrid technology
3.2.10 Biofuels are one of the few options for producing liquid (or indeed gaseous) fuel for conventional motor vehicles from non fossil sources. In principle they offer diversification away from oil dependence and a substantial reduction in CO₂ emissions. The carbon savings of biofuels can vary considerably according to the processes and feedstocks used, as can the impact on biodiversity. Imports could come from unsustainable sources. Future technologies could offer the prospects for better carbon savings than todays.

3.2.11 For the UK, the most immediately promising primary crop source of domestically produced biofuel is biodiesel or rape methyl from rape seed oil. There is already a significant level of commercial production from rapeseed in a number of other countries with the encouragement of substantial fuel duty reductions and other incentives.

3.2.12 Eyre et al^[31] suggest that a substantial share of UK road fuels could be produced from short rotation coppice crops if combined with highly efficient engines. In the short term, production of bioethanol from wheat or sugar beet suffers from many of the same limitations as biodiesel (growing and processing specific crops requires a high level of energy use and other inputs). In the longer term, however, new technologies may make it possible to produce ethanol commercially from vegetable waste materials, at more cost-effective prices.

3.2.13 The 2003 EU Biofuels Directive requires Member States to set indicative targets for biofuels sales for 2005 and 2010, and to introduce a specific labelling requirement at sales points for biofuel blends in excess of 5%. The directive aims for biofuels to make up 2% of the energy content of all fuels used for transport by end 2005, 5.75% by 2010 and 8% towards 2020. The UK aims to achieve a 5% sales target by 2010.

3.2.14 Hybrid-electric passenger cars use small diesel or petrol engine in conjunction with an electric motor and battery. Only two hybrid passenger cars are on sale in the UK: the Toyota Prius and the Honda Civic IMA. Others are reported to be 'production ready'. Efficiency gains of up to 90% reduction in NO_x, CO and hydrocarbons is claimed for the Toyota Prius and reductions in fuel consumption mean that there are also CO₂ emission benefits to be achieved from hybrid vehicles of at least 20 or 30 percent and possibly as much as 50%. These higher gains are possible as the technology will soon be applied to diesel engines. Since they run on conventional fuels, hybrids do not require a dedicated infrastructure and could therefore be introduced quickly and at no infrastructure cost.

3.2.15 The UK has already taken a number of steps to promote the uptake of biofuels and hybrids and to stimulate the market:

• A 20 pence per litre duty incentive on biofuel has been in place since July 2002 and a similar duty incentive for bioethanol was introduced on 1 January 2005.
• The Government has also committed to a rolling three-year period of certainty on the levels of the incentives for both biodiesel and bioethanol.
• Budget 2004 also confirmed the Government's intention to explore new taxation methods that could enable the direct processing of biomass into mainstream conventional refinery processes.
• Hybrid cars currently (2004/05) attract a standard £700 grant from the Energy Saving Trust (EST) PowerShift scheme, which partially offsets the additional purchase costs.

3.2.16 However, uptake of this technology is dependent to a large part on vehicle manufactures supporting the technology. In recent years manufacturers have been withdrawing from this technology due to anticipation that hydrogen fuel cell technology will be the power source of choice in the medium to long term. Many motor manufacturers do not warrant their vehicles to run on biofuel blends higher than 5% and the scope for increasing the uptake of hybrid technology is for the moment limited firstly by a lack of available vehicles.

3.2.17 Nevertheless, biofuels could start delivering significant carbon savings by 2010. The UK biofuels sector is confident that it could readily produce enough biofuel to achieve a 5% sales target by 2010 (given enough support). This could mean carbon savings of close to 1MtC a year which equates to some 3% of total road transport emissions^[32]. Sales of biodiesel have indeed increased rapidly since the introduction of the incentive: from 150,000 litres a month in August 2002 to over two million litres a month in July 2004.

3.2.18 Despite these prospects, biofuels and hybrid technology do not appear to be enjoying the same degree of focus and support as the Liquefied Petroleum Gas sector or the fuel cell industry.

It would be possible to address this discrepancy with the following actions:

Fuel duty differentials could be used to help the UK meet its targets. This will send a long term price signal of the Government's commitment to low carbon transport by rewarding lower carbon forms of fuel. Duty incentives are considered quick, simple and easy to implement and can be targeted at specific fuels. However, there is scope to complement these with some kind of renewables obligation and enhanced capital allowances and even a voluntary agreement with the road fuels industry. A Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) drawing on the experience of the RTFO that applies to licensed electricity suppliers would present long term prospects for delivering all low carbon fuels. In essence, an obligation would require specified sections of the road transport fuel industry to demonstrate that a specified proportion of their aggregate fuel sales were 'renewable transport fuels' to ensure the gradual substitution of fossil fuels/renewable fuels over the long term. Further assessments should be made by government as to how such an obligation might work and whether it would be the most effective and even more politically palatable mechanism. Enhanced capital allowances could support investment in the most environmentally beneficial biofuel processing plants. One method of promoting the use of this technology would be to encourage local authorities and central government to purchase vehicles of this type. Central Government is already doing this and incentives are in place for local authorities (see below).

3.2.19 The most significant barrier, however, may be cost. The Government's Alternative Fuels Framework (2003)^[33] stated that policy must be environmentally, economically and socially sustainable and it must be affordable and provide value for money. Using a duty cut to encourage consumers to switch to biofuels means that the government bears the extra production costs of the fuel in the form of reduced fuel duty revenue. The costs to deliver the 5.75% biofuels target will be in the region of £475m-£850m. These costs are presumed to remain unchanged if the implementation occurs on a faster timescale. Increased uptake, however, will result in additional costs.

3.2.20 Higher capital costs are also a barrier to the uptake of hybrid technology. These vehicles currently cost around £3000 more than equivalent petrol or diesel cars although the cost differential is falling as sales volumes increase and as the technology matures.

3.2.21 Therefore, the costs of achieving the targeted level of biofuel sales would be significant. As set out in the Energy White Paper, the costs of carbon reductions in the transport sector tend to be higher than the costs of delivering carbon savings in other sectors, and the costs of biofuels reflects this. It may be that that carbon savings from hybrid cars are more cost effective than savings from biodiesel. Also, new energy sources may save much more CO₂ if they are used to substitute fossil fuel in heat and power needs rather than being converted into transport fuel.

Therefore, further research should be commissioned to answer the following questions:

How much investment is appropriate now, how is it best to target that investment to get the maximum benefit and over what timescale? How can the cost effectiveness of each technology be assessed according to a standard measure such as cost of gram CO2 per kilometre saved? Can this measure be used to evaluate policies within transport and between transport and other sectors? What are the quickest and cheapest ways to save carbon from transport?

Fuel cells and hydrogen
3.2.22 From the road transport perspective, there have in recent years been important and substantial technical advances in fuel cell technology. Fuel cells have already appeared on the market in stationary applications (not in car technology), but it will take at least 5 years from this point to market a full scale consumer product. Current best estimates assume that the first production H2 fuel cell passenger cars will become available on the market around 2020. An optimistic estimate for 2050 would be that 30% of the vehicle parc consists of fuel cell powered vehicles (with government support).

3.2.23 Fuel cells can deliver a sustained 60% conversion efficiency, whereas internal combustion engines have maximum efficiency of 40% and 45% for petrol and diesel respectively. Energy consumption can thus be halved in urban driving in particular.

3.2.24 There are a number of configurations of fuel cell under development or investigation. The key question for the development of fuel cell engines is how hydrogen is to be generated and stored. Hydrogen could initially come from reformation of natural gas, but may in future come from a range of sources (e.g. reformation of biomass, or electrolysis of water). Only if the hydrogen is obtained via a renewable source of energy can such vehicles claim to be zero emissions vehicles (well to wheel).

3.2.25 There is an emerging consensus that hydrogen and fuel cells represent the dream ticket for future transport technology. However, there are substantial technical barriers to be overcome and it is possible that one of these will prove sufficiently difficult or expensive to cause its delay or abandonment. Uptake is likely to be dependent on a number of factors. For example:

• Availability of vehicles at a price that is competitive with other technologies.
• The technologies for storing hydrogen on board vehicles still need further development. Hydrogen powered vehicles will require a completely new refuelling infrastructure and there is currently great uncertainty about how that infrastructure might be developed and how much it will cost.
• Constraints on renewable energy supplies also mean that renewable hydrogen is almost certainly decades away from being a mass market option, especially if the centralised production and refuelling route.
• Political support for moving to a hydrogen based economy.

3.2.26 There are currently differing perspectives on the most commercially advantageous path to pursue out of the options available. The following factors need to be considered:

• Initial road transport applications are likely to be focused on captive vehicle fleets where there is less of a need for an extensive refuelling infrastructure e.g. public service vehicles. By 2015 the price of fuel cell buses may be closer to that of conventional diesel buses but it is still expected to be a more expensive option.
• Demonstration projects (such as the EU demonstration project (CUTE/ CIVITAS) to fund hydrogen fuel cell bus fleets in 9 major cities across Europe(including London)) are important to investigate the possibilities of using hydrogen fuel cell technology for powering future road transport and provide some early indications of the feasibility of introducing this technology on a larger scale The project is mainly EU-funded, but significant funding has also been provided through the UK TransportEnergy New Vehicle Technology Fund.
• Liquid biofuels from biomass might in the long run prove more attractive or technically viable as a fuel for light vehicles than hydrogen.
• The Government has now begun work to develop a UK hydrogen energy strategic framework and develop hydrogen energy pathways to 2030 that most closely match the UK's overall policy objectives. This will gain clarity over the UK's policy objectives that affect hydrogen energy together with the international context and the role of regional bodies and devolved administrations. Together these factors will provide criteria against which different energy pathways can be assessed and help to develop an action plan for UK hydrogen energy activities. This should address the choices facing policymakers and the barriers to the preferred pathways.
• There are important barriers to be overcome in securing public acceptability of a radically new technology. For example, people will need to be reassured that the new systems are both safe and reliable. This will involve commitment to public education and awareness campaigns on this issue.

In conclusion with respect to alternative fuels, the following points need to be considered:

Our longer term climate change objectives are likely to require a shift to renewably produced fuels. The CO2 efficiency gains possible with conventional engines could well outperform fuel cells for several decades. Although hydrogen fuel cells are likely to be the long term (i.e 2050+) solution and every effort must be made to facilitate their development, the main contribution to UK CO2 emission reduction in the medium term will come from highly advanced internal combustion engines. Investment in today's biofuel industries and incentivising hybrid technology could be a stepping stone to the development of tomorrows very low carbon biofuels technologies. Today's biofuels are expensive and they are likely to remain so to at least 2010 but should not dismiss the long term potential of biofuels to deliver significant carbon savings. However, it may be that that carbon savings from hybrid cars are more cost effective than savings from biodiesel. Assessment of cost effectiveness is urgently needed. Persuading motorists to 'downsize' will be difficult in an environment where real motoring costs are not rising, particularly as larger or less fuel efficiency vehicle are driven by higher income groups. The Government should develop a 'route map' for future fuel infrastructure, which determines the timescale, legislation and investment required. This would involve demonstrating leadership and commitment to the innovation of low carbon vehicle technologies and fuels over the longer term and this will provide the industry with a much needed statement of direction. The government should assess fuel and engine technology options on a well to wheel basis as different vehicle technologies can have substantially different energy consequences upstream of the vehicle. The risk is that policies that foster technological innovation in the development of future low carbon vehicles, be it either biofuel or hydrogen powered vehicles, will be neglected by government policy in favour of short term decision making. In light of the limited spending that is likely to be available for low carbon vehicles, it does not make sense to spread small additional pots of money too thinly across a wide range of vehicle technology or fuel options. Rather, any additional funding should be targeted towards supporting R&D and commercialisation of hybrid-electric technologies, hydrogen, fuel cells and biofuels.

Energy Efficiency of Alternative Modes
3.2.27 If modal shift is to be a focus of policies to reduce CO₂ emissions, a step change in emissions from passenger transport is required. With current vehicle fleet and load factors, average emissions per passenger kilometre for passenger transport modes, especially bus, are not necessarily better than those for fuel efficient cars travelling with more than one occupant.

3.2.28 The prospects are positive in that more radical alternative technologies will initially have a strong focus in buses and other fleet vehicles (delivery vans, taxis etc). Hybrid electric technology for buses is potentially a very attractive option in urban areas. The use of CNG buses will continue to expand initially, but will be superseded by hydrogen fuel cell buses. This is mainly due to the variety of UK based trials of different bus fuels (E.g. Low Carbon Bus Programme (by EST). This is £3m programme to fund up to 150 low carbon buses as demonstration projects.

3.2.29 The Government's Powering Future Vehicles Strategy includes a target that by 2012, one in five new buses will be 'low carbon' with GHG emissions at least 30% lower than achieved by current vehicles. The Government's 2004 Transport White Paper reiterated these aims and looked further ahead to the development of renewable technology.

3.2.28 The 'timeline' of these technologies looks to be as follows:

• between 2005 and 2010 there are limitations with regard to the emissions improvements that can be made. The main barriers are the capital costs of new equipment/ vehicles and changes in the operating and maintenance costs associated with new technology when compared to what is currently available.
• Between 2005 and 2010 it would be technically possible to make large reductions in bus emissions for example by subsidising the replacement of a large part of the UK bus fleet with new Euro 4 or Euro 5 vehicles. However, the huge costs associated with such a measure effectively rule such an option out.
• Over a longer time period, such as between 2010 and 2025 there is the option to have a greater influence over the emissions performance of the UK bus fleet as it would be possible to require bus operators to choose low pollution technologies when replacing parts of their vehicle fleet (CNG/LNG Engines; hybrid/electric engines/ battery electric buses, fuel cell buses). However, if the rate of fleet replacement is not accelerated these benefits would only accrue over a relatively long period of time given the relatively long life of the average bus.

3.2.28 However, these technologies, particularly at current capital and operating costs, would be cost prohibitive for bus operators in the short to medium term. Whilst requirements can be placed on operators to introduce these technologies, passengers cannot be forced to travel at a higher price or more often to offset these costs. Setting targets that accellerate the need for new vehicle investment could effectively push up the cost of operation, making the marginal commercial services unviable with negative accessibility targets.

3.2.29 In the light of these cost and accessibility considerations, the options for government support of these measures are as follows:

Alterations in the structure of the bus subsidy system could be made to favour the uptake and operation of low pollution vehicles whilst discouraging the purchase of conventional diesel vehicles. The DfT concluded that the current bus subsidy formula is likely to reinforce the status quo and 2012 targets are unlikely to be met[34]. The current structure of bus subsidies is a significant barrier to the uptake of new technologies in the bus industry. These need to provide incentives to operators to improve energy efficiency within the existing legislation. For example a fuel tax rebate/ Bus Service Operator's Grant could take the environmental performance of vehicles and/or fuels into account in the allocation of bus subsidy levels. There needs to be a standard and procedure for testing low carbon buses. Current measures such as the Low Carbon Bus programme may need to be supported with further measures to accelerate the uptake of hybrid buses. The rate of bus fleet replacement could be accelerated by setting rising targets for the proportion of an operator's fleet that must be powered at different points in time between 2010 and 2025.

(ii) Fiscal Measures

Fuel duty incentives
3.2.29 In the latter years of the previous Government and the early years of this Labour Government, the fuel duty escalator was employed as a price signal for helping to reduce traffic and CO₂ emissions. The policy of increasing fuel tax effectively contributed to a significant slowing of traffic growth over a period of about two years, and counteracted falls in the underlying price of oil. The increases in duties between 1996 and 1999 are estimated to have produced significant annual carbon savings of between 1 and 2.5 MtC^[35].

3.2.30 Between January 1998 and July 2000 the fuel price rose by 23% above inflation. Analysis by Professor Stephen Glaister at Imperial College, London (2001) shows that assuming a longer term traffic price elasticity of -0.3, this rise would be expected to reduce traffic by about 7 % over the two and half years or an average of 2.8 % per year. This is of the same order as the increase that would be expected as a result of economic growth^[36].

3.2.31 The negative publicity from the fuel protests means that it is highly unlikely that any government will use fuel duty as a price mechanism for reducing traffic and CO₂ emissions for the foreseeable future. The political sensitivity of not increasing fuel taxation is present in the Government's policy which is committed to keeping fuel duty levels roughly the same in real terms in the period to 2010.

3.2.32 Nevertheless, the Chancellor announced in the 2004 Budget a new three-year rolling horizon on duty differentials for road fuel gases (RFGs). RFGs currently benefit from very low duty rates making them around half the price of petrol and diesel. Proper carbon pricing is central to both developing and deploying technology and clear price signals to car users appear to be the most effective measure alongside technological change. The use of the price of conventional fuel as the instrument will also give an additional incentive to travellers to switch to more efficient vehicles or to adopt new technologies earlier than would otherwise be the case.

However, there is much work to be done and the following areas require further consideration:

Research shows the impossibility of sustainable mobility without efficient price signals[37]. Subsidies for the so called clean alternatives will have little effect unless the 'dirty' status quo is clearly marked with taxation'. Even a stiff carbon tax would still leave the price of road fuels relatively unchanged because it is already heavily taxed. Rapid introduction of low CO2 vehicles and fuels will require grants and or tax incentives on a major scale and will erode the large tax base in road transport - the effects of this require further research[38], particularly in the context of assessments for the feasibility of a national congestion charging scheme (see below). Such a measure could have disproportionate effect on lowest income groups who are least likely to be able to afford to purchase these vehicles. Different rates of fuel duty are needed for alternative fuels.

Vehicle Excise Duty (VED)
3.2.33 The UK was the first country in Europe to introduce an explicit CO₂ basis for taxation on vehicle ownership. The Graduated Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) was introduced in 2001. Since then, new cars with CO₂ emissions below pre-defined levels have benefited from a reduced VED tariff. Motorists under the new system can save up to £110 in VED each year by choosing the most efficient and least polluting cars.

3.2.34 However, the evidence suggests that graduated VED was not influencing customer choice^[39]. Research by MORI for the Department for Transport has shown that new car purchasing is dependent on a number of key factors (price, fuel consumption, size, reliability and comfort) but road tax is not among the most significant and environmental considerations are given least consideration. Nearly four in five car buyers did not look at the vehicle's emission rating before purchase and the majority of drivers are still not aware that VED is now calculated on the basis of emissions and still believe that road tax is calculated using the size of a car's engine.

3.2.35 Nevertheless, the Government believes that graduated CO₂-linked VED is an important tool for providing signals to consumers about the environmental impact of their vehicles. However, the following improvements to the scheme could be considered:

The current graduated scheme does not offer a large enough incentive to encourage changes in behaviour. The difference in duty for the most polluting and the cleanest vehicles is small, and the difference between neighbouring bands is minimal. The maximum VED amount currently payable is £165 per annum for a Band D diesel car. This is only £100 more than the rate payable for a Band AAA petrol vehicle. Compared to the overall cost of buying a car and running a car, this charge is insignificant. Therefore, gradations could be finer so that tax rates between low and high carbon vehicles will get steeper. The MORI research suggests that a higher differential would change purchasing behaviour. If the differential between bands was £50, a third of people surveyed said they would change to a less polluting vehicle; if this differential were raised to £150, over half would change; and if it were £300, 72 per cent of private car buyers say they would change to a lower emission model. Such price differentials may also affect car purchasing behaviour for the more marginal second and third vehicles in a household. The Transport Select Committee[40] recommended: 'The difference in the level of carbon emitted from various vehicles is significant: a 4x4 can produce up to four times more carbon dioxide per mile than the most fuel efficient small cars. The way we pay for road use may change radically in the future. However, whilst Vehicle Excise Duty continues to be part of that charge, the way it is structured should be made responsive to evolving policies. The differentials between Vehicle Excise Duty bands must be widened to ensure that the graduated system influences car purchasing decisions. Owners of cars which produce high levels of carbon should be made to pay for the environmental damage they cause.'[41] Consumers need to understand the cost implications of poor fuel economy. Likewise, car buyers are unlikely to be influenced by graduated Vehicle Excise Duty levels if they are not aware of how the system operates. The publicity strategy for this policy needs to be reviewed to ensure that awareness of such initiatives is improved. The introduction of car labelling (discussed below) may support this policy initiative. In addition, the Department could take the opportunity to reinforce the message of how VED is now calculated when issuing the renewal note or through simple measures such as colour-coding the disk.

Company car tax
3.2.36 In April 2002 the Government reformed company car tax and began to calculate it on the basis of carbon dioxide emissions. The reformed system is designed to provide financial incentives for employers and company car drivers to choose cars which emit lower levels of carbon dioxide.

3.2.37 Companies buy about half of the new cars sold each year and because a significant proportion of the second-hand car market consists of ex-company cars there is potential for significant long-term environmental benefits from company car tax.

3.2.38 The Inland Revenue has been carrying out an evaluation of these reforms^[42]. This found:

• in 2003 alone the reforms have saved 0.15 to 0.2 MtC, equivalent to around 0.5% of total CO₂ emissions from all road transport.
• These savings are due to the increased uptake of cleaner conventional vehicles, and in particular a switch to diesel cars, rather than increased use of alternative fuel vehicles.
• Diesel vehicles tend to produce lower carbon dioxide emissions and there has been a significant increase in the sales of diesel cars since the details of the company car tax reform were first announced. It is estimated that the proportion of company cars running on diesel is around 40-45 per cent; and that this will increase to about 50-60 per cent by 2005.
• Over half of employers who provide company cars have changed their policies towards carbon dioxide emissions and are actively encouraging their employees to switch to cars with lower carbon dioxide emissions.
• The cost of the company car tax reform in income tax and National Insurance revenues was estimated to be around £10 million in 2002-03, and around £120 million in 2003-04. Although significantly higher than the Inland Revenue anticipated, the additional costs are modest in the context of overall revenue receipts from company car tax accounts, which totalled £2,660 million in 2000-01.
• It could be concluded that large, corporate fleet buyers are more sensitive to actual as opposed to perceived price signals and would respond to further such changes.

The following improvements to the company car taxation scheme could be made:

Companies typically change their cars on a three to four year cycle. The Inland Revenue should announce taxation levels for periods suited to the timeframe in which company car purchasing and leasing decisions are made. For example, the proposed taxation rates for company cars could be published for the forthcoming four years and be updated on a rolling annual basis. The reform of company car tax policy has had a number of unintended effects. The reform had been the catalyst for structured 'cash for car' schemes and employees have opted out of traditional company car policies and into such schemes. 'Cash for car' schemes remove the focus on carbon dioxide emission levels and allow employees to choose their own model of car. The average carbon dioxide emission level of the vehicles delivered by one personal leasing company was 11 per cent higher than those delivered to customers with traditional company car policies. The increasing popularity of 'cash for car' schemes could undermine the progress made within the company car market.[43] The House of Commons Transport Committee recommended: 'The reformed company car tax regime has been most effective in encouraging cleaner cars. The challenge is to transfer this policy success to the private car market. At present, there are no incentives in place capable of achieving this. Moreover, people are now opting out of the company car regime and choosing higher emitting cars in the private market. The Department for Transport and the Treasury need to create effective mechanisms in the private market to relate motoring charges to pollution more directly.'[44]

Transport Grant programmes and purchase tax
3.2.39 Transport Grant programmes provide strong incentives to clean up the worst polluting (i.e older) vehicles. They comprise grants for conversion to LPG and grants for scrapping vehicles that fail emission tests. These schemes also have the bonus of making better vehicles affordable at the poorer end of the community.

3.2.40 The Government funds purchasing grants to help offset the higher price of cleaner vehicles through the Energy Saving Trust's 'TransportEnergy' programme, which includes 'PowerShift' and 'CleanUp' grants. The PowerShift programme has a budget of £7.5 million for 2004-05 for grants to put towards the additional cost of buying a clean vehicle or converting an existing vehicle to run on cleaner fuels. PowerShift grants cover liquefied petroleum gas, natural gas, electric and hybrid vehicles. Since it began in 1996 the PowerShift programme has funded 17,000 vehicles. The CleanUp programme gives grants to operators of commercial and public sector diesel vehicles (including black cabs, lorries, buses, emergency vehicles and refuse trucks) to assist with the cost of fitting emission reduction technologies. It has a budget of £7.5 million for 2004-05.

3.2.41 The DfT together with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government has reconfirmed their commitment to the TransportEnergy programmes and funding of £24m for 2005-2006^[45].

3.2.42 Together, the TransportEnergy programmes have saved 34,210 tonnes of CO₂ emissions in the last two years^[46]. The role of the grants is not to effect mass change in the car fleet but can help encourage new technologies by pump priming new types of vehicles to help them break into what is essentially a very conservative market. The real 'heavy lifting' is then done by the Treasury through other fiscal incentives^[47].

3.2.43 While it continues to be a successful initiative, extra funding could be provided to the grant scheme given the slow progress towards government environmental commitments. However, public expenditure is not unlimited and the merit of these policies as compared to other measures designed to reduce emissions from the transport sector have not been adequately assessed. Upon further assessment, it may be that these grant schemes are useful to promote experiment, but have limited scope to affect fundamental change.

Conclusions on fiscal measures

Economic instruments must be efficient and equitable. The government should undertake a formal review of the role and objectives of taxation and pricing in transport - tax is a key instrument in signalling priorities and influencing business and consumer behaviour. It should set out how the tax structure contributes to climate change objectives and how it interacts with other areas of policy. Rather than attempting to 'pick winners', a technologically-neutral approach to incentives should be adopted. This should be supported by identifying the objectives the Government needs to achieve and encouraging and rewarding whichever technologies and fuels deliver against these aims. A recent press release by the DfT (21/12/04) has adopted such an approach[48] within the TransportEnergy Programme and this is to be welcomed across the various transport measures.



3.3 Freight

Lorry fuel efficiency
3.3.1 There is no doubt that fuel is one of the largest cost elements for the haulage industry and competition already drives fuel efficiency. However, technological improvements leading to absolute reductions in CO₂ emissions from commercial vehicles are not currently expected in the same way as with cars. In contrast to company and private cars, there are less tax incentives for encouraging greater fuel economy within the HGV fleet. The pace of fuel efficiency improvements is therefore likely to be much slower for HGVs^[49].

3.3.2 A recent report by the Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment (ACBE)^[50] observed that easier regulations for commercial vehicles under 3.5 tonnes have led to a switch from smaller HGVs to large panel vans which have become the vehicle of choice for urban deliveries. This trend towards larger LGVs carrying heavier loads is likely to increase van fuel consumption, adversely impacting on average CO₂ emissions across the LGV fleet as a whole.

3.3.3 For heavier vans and HGVs, the picture is also rather unclear due to lack of comprehensive data on CO₂ emissions performance. More or less all of the growth in HGV traffic is occurring in the largest articulated lorries which currently account for 13% of all traffic on motorways. As the mileage of articulated lorries have been growing, their average payload has been getting lighter as the types of goods being hauled have shifted from heavy commodities to lighter, high value consumer goods. This has meant that even though the average CO₂ emissions per kilometre travelled by an articulated lorry has been improving there has been a deterioration in the CO₂ emissions per tonne kilometre hauled^[52]. This may, however, have beneficial effects from a road maintenance point of view and an assessment of all the advantages and disadvantages of current trends need to be assessed.

The following issues could be taken forward in this area:

Commercial vehicle manufacturers should be required to publish fuel efficiency data to common benchmarks. This would allow potential purchasers of vehicles to investigate performance against anticipated operating conditions. The government should evaluate the case for pressing for a negotiated agreement on CO2 emissions for commercial vehicles along the line already agreed for cars. The Government could offer incentives to vehicle operators to replace older more polluting and less fuel efficient vehicles by incentivising earlier than planned replacement of new vehicles.

Sustainable distribution
3.3.4 Improved logistics, such as on board equipment for managing goods handling, have enhanced efficiency gains. But this has been mirrored by changes in distribution patterns, such as the development of regional distribution centres and 'just in time' deliveries, which has increased long distance HGV travel.

3.3.5 It is well documented that around one third of all freight vehicle journeys are made empty. A greater utlisation of the freight fleet will lead to a drop in congestion, CO₂ levels and increased efficiency for business^[53]. There is scope for improving the efficiency of backhauling and freight Distribution Centres and Intermodal Loading Units for urban freight.

The following issues could be taken forward in this area:

Government and industry need to support further development of commercial brokerage networks with services targeted at smaller operators. The construction of transfer centres on the outskirts of cities and towns where goods are transferred from heavy vehicles to low emission light vans could be encouraged.

Rail freight
3.3.6 In the 10YP, the government expected freight transport to achieve its forecast contribution of a reduction in CO₂ emissions by 0.7 MtC by 2010 and included a target of an 80% growth in rail freight (although CfIT suggested that it may be more appropriate to include new targets to reflect the different market sectors).

3.3.7 Average external climate change costs for rail freight in 1995 were 3 Euro per 100 tonnes compared to 16 Euro for road, so - in theory - there is considerable potential to reduce emissions by transferring freight from road to rail.

3.3.8 Nevertheless, potential savings from a transfer of freight from road to rail are tempered by capacity constraints across the rail network. Furthermore, given that the feeder links required to facilitate an expansion of rail freight will themselves generate climate change emissions, the net emission savings from a widespread shift from road to rail is likely to less significant than the figures noted above might suggest.

3.3.9 Further research is therefore required into how best to optimise any transfer of freight from road to rail in terms of net CO₂ reduction.

3.4 Aviation

3.4.1 CfIT's report on aviation's external costs argued that the aviation industry is not meeting its internal costs, and that revenues accrued from the industry's main fiscal instrument - Aviation Passenger Duty - is not enough to meet current cost estimates for climate change from the aviation industry. CfIT has also previously argued that APD was not well suited to meeting environmental objectives as it gives:

• Little incentive to airlines to reduce external cost; and
• No efficient incentive to passengers to (re)consider their journey against external costs and damages.

3.4.2 The scope for developing policies to reduce climate change emissions from aviation is constrained by the global nature of the industry. Although individual countries can regulate domestic flights, initiatives that include international long-haul flights must be agreed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), while the EU is also a powerful influence in determining aviation policy. In particular, The ICAO does not support policies - such as environmental landing charges - that are likely to undermine economic growth.

3.4.3 In contrast, the UK Government's ability to introduce policies aimed at reducing emissions from international aviation is limited. The ICAO in particular is unlikely to consider economic measures that might affect the industry's profitability - such as a global tariff on fuel duty. Thus while Defra's consultation document indicates the UK will continue "to explore the scope for the use of other economic instruments to tackle aviation issues", and "reserve the right to act alone or bilaterally with like-minded partners", this is unlikely to happen in reality as the unilateral or bilateral introduction of fuel or landing charges would merely act to undermine - national - competitiveness in a global market.

(i) Technology

3.4.4 To quote Lee^[54]:

"The [aviation] industry can be characterised as one that is technologically mature, dominated by long lead-in times from research through to market, long in-service lifetimes, and overwhelming issues of safety to comply with. This combined with sustained growth rates in the order of 3-5% per annum over decadal time frames conspires to make emissions reductions very difficult." (page 17)

3.4.5 There have been considerable reductions in CO₂ emissions from aircraft in recent years. More efficient engines, more aerodynamic airframes and improved fuel technology mean that aircraft consume less fuel (thus emitting less CO₂) which lowers running costs for airlines. Reducing emissions is therefore consistent with greater economic competitiveness.

3.4.6 Including gains in operational efficiency (discussed below), UK airlines anticipated a improvement in 23% fuel efficiency between 2001 and by 2012, while Defra have endorsed a target adopted by the Advisory Council on Aeronautics Research in Europe which outlines a 50 per cent reduction in CO₂ from new aircraft by 2020. However the annual growth rates highlighted above and the long operational lives of aircraft means that this will not be enough to offset the rise in emissions the projected growth in commercial air traffic.

3.4.7 Furthermore, while higher engine temperatures and pressures reduce fuel consumption, these conditions result in increased emissions of NO_x, so that CO₂ savings are not proportional to overall reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. While technological advances should produce engines that significantly reduce CO₂ and NO_x emissions, but these are still some years off.

(ii) Fiscal measures: emissions trading

3.4.8 Given that the increased emissions from the growth of air travel is set to outstrip technological improvements, much is expected from emissions trading. In theory, the inclusion of aviation in an emissions trading scheme has a number of advantages:

• The concept of emissions trading is supported unanimously by ICAO states.
• The EU already emissions is due for review in 2006, so aviation could be included as early as 2008 as a precursor to a global scheme.
• It could allow aviation emissions to grow within an overall reducing total, limiting the economic impacts on the industry.
• The extent to which an emissions trading scheme can ultimately drive down emissions from aviation is still very much open to question, however.

3.4.9 Reduction in emissions wrought from a trading scheme will depend on the agreed cap for the air transport sector. For the initial EU scheme to succeed, the cap has to be set at a level that constrains the growth in emissions without risking competition distortion (with non-EU airlines benefiting). Similarly, any agreement on a global scheme will have to be ratified by the ICAO, which will not want to unduly undermine long term economic prospects for the industry.

3.4.10 Given the difficulties inherent in reaching any internationally binding agreement, the UK and/or EU cannot be optimistic about to negotiating a punitive cap on CO₂ form aviation, and emissions trading on its own may not be sufficient to achieve substantial cuts in greenhouse emissions.

3.4.11 A further shortcoming associated with including aviation in a trading scheme (as things stands) is that there is no provision for including other global warming emissions such as including NO_x, contrails, etc. Nevertheless, given that it is better to trade something than nothing in the short to medium term, it is sensible to include CO₂ from aviation as a first stage. As will be discussed below, developing measures to deal with these other emissions should be a future priority.

3.4.12 This stance is consistent with CfIT's recommendations on aviation's external costs. CfIT also recommended that a 2.7 multiplier should be adopted to take account of other climate change emissions. However, as is noted in 3.4.14, this is scientifically complex, and more research is needed before NO_x, contrails, etc can be included in an emissions trading scheme (see section 4.5.3. for example).

3.4.13 Of greater concern is the ability of an aviations emissions trading scheme to actually work on practice. In order to succeed a trading market has to have liquidity, which in turn depends on good product definition, effective and straightforward settlement, compliance and regulatory mechanisms, price transparency, the existence of buyers and sellers, and overall confidence in the market. Lack of liquidity and/ or confidence in a market will lead to collapse.

3.4.14 In considering a workable aviation emissions trading scheme, a potential conflict exists between the unavoidable complexity of the science and the required simplicity of an emissions market. For instance, how can flights with different altitude, duration and emission profiles (e.g. long haul vs. short haul) be traded without an necessarily elaborate trading mechanism? Establishing a scheme that emission traders will have full confidence in is unlikely to be straightforward.

3.4.15 In considering a worst case scenario, a global trading scheme could take 8-12 years to establish but only a day to collapse.

(iii) Other measures: 'green flight'

3.4.16 There is potential to reduce emissions further through operational measures. These include:

• Reducing taxi, cruise and landing times through more efficient air/ground traffic control systems. The projected 23% fuel efficiency improvement between 1990 and 2012 could be increased with a further 6% improvement secured from air traffic control measures^[55].
• Routing flights to avoid environmentally sensitive parts of the atmosphere. Flight paths and cruising altitudes be modelled to minimise the environmental impact on different routes. However, such 'green flight' studies are still in their infancy and much more research is required before such a radical approach can become a reality.

3.4.17 In aiming to improve the operational efficiency of airports and flight planning CfIT previously recommended that:

• Landing and take off slots should be auctioned to manage peak time demand; and
• Congestion charging should be introduced for airlines to reflect the external costs for use of airspace at different times of the day.

While acknowledging the various constraints involved in changing global and EU aviation policy, as well as potential opposition from UK airport operators, more research should be carried out to evaluate the potential contribution of these approaches.

With the rise in international aviation emissions outstripping savings from technological and operational improvements, the Government and EU must do everything to ensure that an aviation emission scheme succeeds. Future priority must be given to including all aviation emissions in a trading scheme (as will be discussed below) and to funding research on green flight modelling.

---

25: Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders Ltd (SMMT) 2004 Annual Report: UK New Car Registrations by CO₂ Performance.
26: Foley,J and Fergusson,M 2003.
27: House of Commons Transport Committee 2004 Cars of the Future 17th Report of Sessions 2003-04.
28: DTI (2003). Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy. Energy White Paper Department of Trade and Industry available at www.berr.gov.uk/energy/index.html.
29: p24.
30: WWF (undated) Will voluntary agreements at EU level deliver on environmental objectives?.
31: Eyre,N; Fergusson,, M and Mills, R 2002 Fuelling Road Transport: Implications for Energy Policy Energy Savings Trust, Institute for European Environmental Policy, National Society for Clear Air, London.
32: Consultation Biofuels: summary of consultation responses DFT 2004 available at (www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2004/tuksb/).
33: The Alternative Fuels Framework is contained in Pre-Budget Report 2003, at chapter 7 (www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./media/5/7/pbr03chap7_145.pdf).
34: DfT 2003 Economics of Bus Drivelelines.
35: DETR 2000 Climate Change Draft UK Programme Chapt.5 Transport.
36: Glaister S (2001) UK Transport Policy 1997-2001. Paper delivered to the Economics Section of the British Association for Science, Glasgow, 4th September 2001.
37: Potter et al 2004 Taxation Futures for Sustainable Mobility Final Report available at www.psi.org.uk.
38: ibid.
39: MORI 2003 Assessing the Impact of the Graduated Vehicle Excise Duty research study conducted for the DfT.
40: House of Commons Transport Committee 2004 Cars of the Future 17th Report of Sessions 2003-04.
41: (ibid).
42: Details of the evaluation are available at www.hmrc.gov.uk.
43: House of Commons Transport Committee 2004 Cars of the Future 17th Report of Sessions 2003-04.
44: ibid.
45: DfT 2005.
46: House of Commons Transport Committee 2004 Cars of the Future 17th Report of Sessions 2003-04.
47: ibid.
48: cited in DfT 2005.
49: Foley,J and Fergusson,M 2003 Putting the Brakes on Climate Change: A policy report on road transport and climate change. IPPR, London.
50: ACBE (2002) Transport Interim Report. Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment.
51: DfT (2003) Managing Our Roads. Department for Transport.
52: ACBE 2002.
53: ACBE 2002.
54: from Lee, D. (2004) Issues in Environmental Science and Technology , No 20, Transport and the Environment pp 1-23.
55: From Grayling, T. and Bishop, S (2001) Sustainable Aviation 2030: Discussion document published by IPPR.

[ Previous ] [ Contents ] [ Next ]