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Bus subsidy simulation study

3: The Bus Simulation Model

3.1: Background and Earlier Work

In March 2002, LEK submitted the Final Report on the study Obtaining Best Value for Public Subsidy for the Bus Industry to the Commission for Integrated Transport. One of the key recommendations of the LEK study is to "replace the current system of fuel duty rebate with a system of subsidy per passenger boarding. Provide additional funding in rural and inter-urban areas to counteract any decline in subsidy on routes or services in these areas arising from a move to a system of subsidy per passenger boarding."[5]

LEK identified two scenarios (of which they recommended the first):

  • The entire budget of FDR is allocated to the IPP subsidy and a safety net is made available out of additional funding for rural and interurban routes.[6] The resultant rate per-passenger is 10.4p ("Increased Revenue Subsidy");
  • The entire budget of FDR is allocated to the IPP subsidy, but the safety net for rural and interurban routes is netted off against this so that the IPP is reduced to 9.2p("Optimised Current Revenue Subsidy").

LEK are predicting total passenger volume uplifts in each of the two scenarios as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 - LEK Projected Passenger Volume Uplift from Replacing FDR by an IPP Subsidy


Total Project Passenger Volume Uplift (%)
Optimised Current Revenue
Subsidy (IPP of 9.2p)
Increased Revenue Subsidy
(IPP of 10.4p)
Short TermMedium TermShort TermMedium Term
Fare0.30.41.52.6
Initiatives2.810.02.810.0
Average/Total3.110.44.312.6

Source: LEK

The LEK recommendations were based on LEK's own analyses and on route analyses conducted by the Institute for Transport Studies of the University of Leeds (ITS). For the route analyses, ITS used its Quality Bus Model that has been developed in the context of earlier work for the Department for Transport.

LEK considered initiatives that would increase operator profitability. The particular initiatives in Table 3.1 were the fitting of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) to buses, and driver training to improve interface with passengers. These were costed at £1,500 to £3,000 per vehicle for CCTV, and £200 per driver for training. Financial benefits were based on a comparison of the cost per extra passenger generated based also on quality elasticities from their stated preference work, and the extra revenue allowing for fare revenue and the per passenger subsidy. These particular initiatives generated significant growth in traffic given the quality of service elasticities used.

Other relevant work on the possible replacement of FDR with an IPP system has been carried out by TRL in a study for the Department for Transport. TRL analysed how profitability of bus operators would change as a result of the change in subsidy structure, and analysed a number of hypothetical scenarios where the profitability impact was calculated for cases in which fares were increased or service levels were reduced.

Following the receipt of the LEK report, CfIT wished to gain more insight into how exactly bus operators and local authorities would respond to the change in subsidy structure and whether the change would indeed provide an incentive to operators to increase patronage. To assess this, a detailed simulation model of bus routes has been developed that we will discuss in the next sections of this report.

3.2: The Model Developed for the Present Study

One of the key requirements of the simulation exercise in the present study is that all the short and long term responses from operators in the selected areas were to be considered. Since the behaviour of operators in the deregulated bus market can be characterised as maximising their profits subject to constraints, it was necessary to build a model that replicated the decision making process of bus operators.

It was decided at a very early stage in the study that the simulation model should be built on the level of individual routes. Responses of operators could be expected to differ between routes and such differing responses would not have been picked up by a more aggregate approach.

The model that was to be developed should therefore be capable of maximising route profits subject to any constraints that the operator faces. The model should allow the user to select a subsidy mechanism (FDR or IPP) and to see what the impact of a change in subsidy system is on:

  • route profitability; and
  • the operator's profit-maximising decisions on a particular route.

In order to be able to simulate the combination of fares and service levels that would maximise profits for the operator, it was necessary to estimate both a demand and a cost function. Estimating a demand and a cost function is only possible if a number of assumptions are made to keep the functions and the subsequent optimisation process manageable. It is for example possible to determine how average fare levels need to change in order to maximise profits but not how each individual fare will change: that would (i) require detailed information on the sensitivity of total demand to changes in each individual fare and (ii) render the optimisation results unstable and unlikely to be realistic.

We note that although simplifications were necessary in developing the model, these simplifications were not extended to the study itself. Whereas, for example, the modelling approach did not allow us to evaluate whether operators are likely to cut routes short in response to the proposed change in subsidy structure, these issues were covered in detail in the interviews with operators in which the modelled results were discussed.

  • price, P;
  • buses per hour, B; and
  • quality, Z.

The quality variable represents all quality dimensions other than frequency. The variable is continuous and has been defined according to the following reference points:

  • level 1: a basic bus service without specific quality features;
  • level 2: a bus service with low-floor buses, driver training and CCTV; and
  • level 3: as level 2, plus good shelters with real-time information and CCTV.

Currently, it tends to be the local authority that is responsible for quality measures in regard to shelters, so the question could be asked whether operators engage themselves in providing quality improvements by investing in infrastructure. In view of the fact that on a number of routes in our sample, quality level 2 had already been achieved, it was however necessary also to introduce a higher quality level to see if the proposed change in subsidy system would provide incentives to these operators to invest more in quality than they currently do.

One of the insights gained from the first round of interviews was that decisions on tendered services are often made on the back of the commercial service product. This applies for example to fares, where the fares charged on tendered evening services are often the same as those charged during daytime. It may also apply to quality if the vehicles used to operate commercial services are the same as those used to operate tendered services on the same route. The model therefore applies to commercial services only, where the operator has the discretion to set all three key variables that are used in the model. The implications for currently tendered and currently marginal services were assessed at a later stage, outside the model.

The model can be set up for any time period; in practice the operators have supplied data for four-week periods.

The estimation of the demand and cost functions is described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 below.

3.3: The Demand Model

3.3.1 Overview

The purpose of the demand function in the overall optimisation model is to specify the sensitivity of bus demand to the key variables that are at the discretion of the operator.

A key element of the present study was to set up the model for a number of routes with various characteristics (e.g. urban, interurban, rural) in order to determine whether the impact of the proposed change in subsidy system would vary across different types of route. The model should therefore be flexible and be able to accommodate various route type characteristics.

A second key element of the study was that the modelled results would not be used on their own but would be discussed in follow-up interviews with operators. In view of this, it was essential that the model was able to take local circumstances into account, for example the local sensitivity of demand to price changes, and the local potential for patronage growth.

It was therefore decided not to use national or other general parameters on the sensitivity of bus demand to price, frequency and quality, but to specify the demand model in a flexible way and to determine the appropriate demand sensitivities in discussions with the operators (as part of the second round of interviews).

3.3.2 Functional Form of the Demand Model

Given that the model is an optimisation model, a constant elasticity model could not be used. In such a model, raising prices would (assuming inelastic demand) always be profitable, so that the modelled profit-maximising price would tend to infinity and therefore be unrealistic.

This left a choice between two other main functional forms for the demand model:

  • Linear:

mathematical formula

  • Negative Exponential:

mathematical formula

Of these, the negative exponential form was chosen for use in the study. A negative exponential form has an elasticity proportional to the absolute fare level which previous experience in modelling bus demand has shown to be broadly appropriate. By contrast, a linear demand curve has in the past been found to be too sensitive to fare. There is in fact a tradition of using negative exponential demand functions in bus modelling, for examples LT Planning works on this basis. However, the exact form of equation (2) was amended to model more appropriately the sensitivity of demand to frequency changes, and to appropriately model the quality variable.

Additional flexibility in regard to the frequency elasticity was required in view of the comments made by bus operators about certain routes having limited growth potential. On these routes, increasing frequency might not result in substantial patronage growth but it may still be possible to lose substantial numbers of passengers if frequency is reduced to unacceptably low levels. The flexibility was introduced by introducing an additional variable j in the following way:

mathematical formula

By varying the variable j, the difference between the upside and downside potential of demand in response to frequency changes can be varied (for example by introducing B in a quadratic rather than linear form).

The quality variable Z has been introduced in a way that prevents the model from selecting quality levels higher than three, since such values are undefined. In view of the robustness of the optimisation results, it was necessary to introduce a continuous function rather then simply cut off the quality variable at level three. The desired property was largely achieved in the following way:

mathematical formula

This introduces quality as a quadratic form with a peak at Z=4, i.e. demand actually falls when selecting a quality level of excess of four, and is almost flat when the value of four is approached. In combination with quality costs rising more than proportionately with increasing quality, a situation where the optimisation model selects overly high quality levels is thereby avoided.

3.3.3 Parameter Estimation

For each route, the parameters of the demand function have been estimated taking two different perspectives into account:

  • According to how demand might be expected to respond to price and frequency changes on the basis of evidence from earlier studies; and
  • According to how the relevant operator believes demand will respond to changes in price, frequency and quality.

Since the existing evidence on the responsiveness of demand to quality is not very well developed, operator views of the sensitivity of demand to quality were used in all cases.

The previous demand elasticities were drawn from the work that ITS did for LEK/CfIT. In Table 3.2 of their final report, the following relevant demand sensitivities are included:

Table 3.2 - Demand Responses from ITS Work for LEK/CfIT

Route Type Percentage Impact on Bus Patronage of
20% fares cut20% frequency increase
Large radial+6.1+3.5
Medium radial+14.8+7.8
Interurban+8.2+12.7
Rural+14.9+11.3

Source: ITS report to LEK/CfIT, 2002

Although the ITS result suggests inelastic demand (in terms of price) for all route types under consideration, using these elasticities in our optimisation model was found to be problematic. When assuming a price elasticity of -0.3 (as in the results for the large radial route above), the theoretical profit maximising price will, given the demand function used, produce a predicted profit-maximising price of two to three times the current price. It was not felt to be sensible to use such a price as our base position and estimate the impacts of a move from FDR to IPP against such a benchmark.

An important result from our interview programme was that although operators generally perceive the short run elasticities on their routes as inelastic, they do not feel this to be the case in the long run. They believe that they can earn more profits in the short run by increasing fares above the current levels but feel that due to the additional patronage falls that they would suffer in the longer term, increasing fares would not be consistent with building a sustainable business. We therefore believe that when modelling operators' profit maximising decisions, it is the long run elasticity values that are the relevant ones to use.[7] In view of this, the model has been set up with a long-run demand elasticity for small price changes (10 per cent) of around - 0.9. This compares with lower values used by LEK, who used a medium run fare elasticity value of -0.8.

The ITS frequency elasticities more accurately reproduced operators' current profit maximising decisions (taking into account the fact that typically, operators run more buses than would be profit maximising due to the threat of entry), so these were therefore retained. It was eventually decided to set the power variable j at 1.5 for all routes and to calibrate the i variable so as to achieve the elasticity values above for small frequency changes.[8] This way, a reasonable balance was achieved between the upside and downside sensitivity of demand to frequency changes.

In the absence of sufficiently robust theoretical evidence on the sensitivity of demand to quality, operators' views on the impacts of quality measures on demand were used to arrive at the assumptions contained in Table 3.3. We note that these quality elasticities are significantly below those assumed by LEK. However, in view of the fact that we were seeking to predict how operators would respond to the change in subsidy system, and since operators will base their response on their own views, we considered it to be important that the assumptions used reflected operators' views as much as possible.

Table 3.3 - Impact on Demand of Changes in Quality Levels


To
Quality level 1Quality level 2Quality level 3
From Quality Level 1 0% +8.4% +13.7%
Quality Level 2 -9.2% 0% +4.9%
Quality Level 3 -12.1% -4.7% 0%

Table 3.3 shows that decreasing returns to quality have been assumed. This assumption was necessary in order to make the optimisation model work; if this assumption had not been made, the model could have produced optimal quality levels well in excess of 3, for which no quality dimensions had been defined. We believe that the assumptions in Table 3.3 are, nevertheless, a reasonable reflection of operators' views of quality improvements. It should also be noted that investment in bus lanes etc. was not considered as part of the present study as operators would not undertake this in any case. In the context of the quality levels as defined above, such investments would have resulted in levels of well over 3, with substantially higher patronage gains.

3.3.4 Demand Model Calibration

After the parameters have been estimated, the demand model needs to be calibrated by the user so that it replicates the current demand given current prices, frequency and quality levels. The calibration involves setting the appropriate value for the y variable in equation (4) so that the current demand level is reproduced given the estimated parameters and the current demand, price, frequency and quality levels.

3.4: The Cost Model

3.4.1 Introduction

Like the demand model, an essential feature of the cost model had to be that it should be based on the actual costs on the modelled bus routes. This would ensure that the modelled results be realistic for the routes under consideration, maximising the value of the second interview round with operators.

The cost model has been built on the basis of CIPFA principles. These principles, which are widely used in the bus industry, imply that costs are allocated to one of the following three cost drivers:

  • vehicle hours;
  • vehicle kilometres; or
  • peak vehicle requirement.

The model consists of two main elements:

  • an analysis of current costs on the route, allocating them to vehicle hours; vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles; using current levels of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles, unit costs are calculated for each of the cost drivers.
  • an estimation of the number of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles needed to run a given modelled timetable, and calculation of the total costs using the unit costs estimated above.

These two elements are discussed in the two subsections below.

3.4.2 Current Cost Drivers

A number of cost categories can be entered into the model (which may vary since operators' accounting methods vary) and each category can then be allocated to vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres or peak vehicles.

Some operators provided data showing their costs broken down between time related costs, distance related costs or maximum peak vehicle requirements or overhead related costs, in which case these costs have been allocated to the relevant cost driver. Other operators provided a more detailed breakdown of costs (staff costs, maintenance, depreciation etc.). In these cases, the costs have been allocated as follows:

  • to vehicle hours: staff costs, engineering costs, overhead costs;
  • to vehicle kilometres: fuel costs, tyres costs; and
  • to peak vehicles: depreciation, insurance, licence costs.

On the basis of the levels of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles needed to operate the current timetable on a route (data supplied by operators), unit costs for vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles were then estimated.[9]

Fuel costs were treated separately since current net fuel cost levels would no longer be correct if FDR were to be abolished. Fuel costs were therefore made dependent on the level of FDR: if this is reduced or abolished, current fuel costs and the cost per vehicle kilometre are automatically adjusted upwards.

3.4.3 Costs to Run the Model Timetable

The second element of the cost model is an estimation of the number of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles required to run a given timetable, and a calculation of the resulting costs using the unit costs estimated above.

To this end, the model requires a number of base inputs, such as the length of the route, the average round trip time and the maximum round trip. Values of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles were then calculated using the following formulae:

Vehicle Hours = avtime * bph * hpd * boardpen * adj

Vehicle Kilometres = 2 * routelen * bph * hpd * adj

Peak Vehicle Requirement = maxtime * bph * adj

Where:

avtime is the average round trip time
bph is buses per hour
hpd is hours per day
boardpen is the boarding time penalty
adj is an adjustment factor
routelen is the length of route
maxtime is the maximum round trip time

The adjustment factor is necessary for various reasons, including such factors as waiting times at termini and driver training, but also because of issues related to the necessary simplifications to the model. For example, the timetable could only be represented in the model as an average frequency per hour. If in fact some buses terminate short of their final destination, or frequency varies during the day, the modelled number of vehicle hours, vehicle kilometres and peak vehicles will be different from the actual ones. Applying an adjustment factor ensured that the cost model correctly replicated the cost of operating the current timetable on the route.

Our approach assumes that the factors influencing the adjustment factor would remain unchanged during the optimisation process. However, a number of important issues arising from the proposed subsidy change (such as the possibility of some services terminating outside the busy section) were discussed in detail with the operators during the follow-up interviews.

A boarding time penalty was introduced in the vehicle hours formulae to avoid a zero marginal cost per passenger in the model, which could lead to undesirable results when optimising. A time penalty of three seconds per passenger was used.[10] As boarding time delays are already implicit in the average round trip time and therefore counted twice, the adjustment factor was set to compensate for this double counting effect.

3.4.4 Additional Elements in the Cost Model

A number of additional elements were introduced to the cost model to facilitate the optimisation process. The first additional element is the explicit representation of quality. Since quality is one of the three key variables examined, it was essential to have it represented in a realistic way both in regard to its costs and its revenues.

The costs of providing quality have been derived from ITS (2002),[11] in which estimates of the amortised weekly unit costs of providing quality are contained. Using these figures, a quality cost function was estimated dependent on the level of quality provided, the number of stops on the route and the number of peak vehicles required. To ensure realistic optimisation results, the level of quality was specified as a quadratic, implying that modest quality improvements are relatively cheap but that more substantial quality improvements become progressively more expensive.

The second additional element introduced in the cost function was a relief cost function. The idea of relief costs was also based on the ITS work and assumes that the operator is required to run relief buses if services become overcrowded. Although strong assumptions are required to estimate a relief cost function, the inclusion of such a function in the model is essential to avoid the model producing profit-maximising results with unrealistically high load factors.

An approach was chosen whereby the relief cost function imposes penalties if the average load factor selected by the model is significantly higher than the current average load factor. The current average load factor is influenced by a large number of factors, including for example the ratio between peak and off-peak traffic. If traffic is reasonably evenly spread throughout the day and week, it will be possible to achieve higher average load factors than in a situation where there are very strong peaks. Whilst a move to IPP may result in patronage growth and thereby produce small increases in load factors, large modelled increases in load factor will not be realistic.

The penalties are imposed by multiplying the costs as calculated in Section 3.4.3 by a factor that increases as the ratio of modelled to current load factors increases.[12] Initially, the penalties need to be very small but then have to become progressively more severe. This was achieved by modelling the relief cost multiplication factor as a cubic function, the shape of which is shown in Figure 3.1.13

Figure 3.1 - Form of Relief Cost Function

Figure 3.1 - Form of Relief Cost Function

3.5: Profitability Calculation

The model includes a separate sheet where the profit and loss account is shown. The revenues are obtained by multiplying the average fare per passenger (which includes the concessionary fares reimbursement) by the number of passengers, to which then the total IPP (if any) and any current tendered revenue are added. The total IPP plays an important role in the model but the current tendered revenue does not; this is included for information purposes only.

The costs are composed of the core costs as calculated in Section 3.4.3, to which the quality costs and the relief costs are then added.

The model shows the absolute level of profit and the return on sales achieved.

3.6: The Optimisation Model

The optimisation model, shown in Figure 3.2, uses the Solver routine in Microsoft Excel and is able to maximise profits by manipulating the price, buses per hour and quality variables, subject to a number of constraints.

Before optimising, a subsidy scenario should be chosen. By default, it is possible to choose the current level of FDR (at 80 per cent of duty payable); IPP of 10 pence; or any combination in between (e.g. reducing the FDR from 80 to 40 per cent and introducing a IPP of 5 pence). It is also possible to change the default values, for example to evaluate the impact of increasing FDR from 80 to 100 per cent, or to evaluate the impact of introducing IPP without reducing the level of FDR. Certain constraints are imposed at every optimisation round. These are that the price charged and the quality level should be positive. Other constraints can be imposed at the discretion of the user. There are four possibilities:

  • Maximise profit. In this case, it is possible, but not mandatory, to impose the constraint that the frequency should be an integer. This constraint can be imposed because in the vast majority of cases, the frequency per hour that operators run is indeed an integer. However, it is not necessary to impose this constraint, and allowing frequency to vary continuously allows us to evaluate how the change in subsidy system will affect marginal incentives to increase or decrease frequency;
  • Maximise profit subject to bus frequency equal to a certain value. With this option, the desired frequency can be entered and the model optimises by holding frequency constant and manipulating just the other two variables. This option is very important if the operator runs more buses than it otherwise would have done to avoid profitable gaps into which competitors might enter. It can also be used to evaluate possible strategies where the frequency is not an integer, e.g. one buses per two hours (in which case the value to be entered is 0.5);
  • Maximise profit subject to price equal to a certain value. This option holds price constant and manipulates frequency and quality. This option is useful if the operator chooses to set prices below profit-maximising levels, again possibly to deter entry or for political reasons;
  • Maximise profit subject to quality equal to a certain value. With this option, only fare and frequency are manipulated. This option can be used if there is no scope for changing the quality level offered, for example if new buses have just been introduced on the route which are not going to be modified in the short or medium term.

The optimisation model automatically records the situation immediately prior to the optimisation so that the situations before and after the optimisation can be readily compared. It is also possible to fix a certain outcome as the base case, to which all subsequent outcomes are compared. The model also records all outcomes on a separate output sheet.

Figure 3.2 - Optimisation Model

Figure 3.2 - Optimisation Model


5: LEK (2002) Obtaining Best Value for Public Subsidy for the Bus Industry, Final Report, p8.
6: CfIT have informed us that the safety net proposed by LEK works by compensating bus operators of all rural and interurban services services for any loss of Day 1 profits that result from the switch from FDR to IPP.
7: A recent detailed econometric study of the demand for local bus services in England concluded that the most likely values of the fare elasticity for England as a whole are around -0.4 in the short run, and -0.9 in the long run: Joyce M Dargay and Mark Hanly "The demand for local bus services in England" Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, January 2002, pp.73-91, see p.90.
8: The combination of the i and j variables represent the frequency elasticity. Given a value for j of 1.5, the i variable was calibrated such that the combination of the i and j variables resulted for small frequency changes (e.g. 10 per cent) in the frequency elasticities in Table 3.2. These frequency elasticities were sourced from the ITS report to LEK and we expect them as such to be consistent with what one would expect. The principal impact of setting j at 1.5 (as opposed to 1) is to dampen the modelled patronage increases for large frequency increases. This dampening was necessary to ensure that the model resulted in profit-maximising positions at plausible frequency levels.
9: These unit costs are defined as follows: - Cost per hour: (current hours related costs)/current vehicle hours - Cost per kilometre: (current kilometre-related costs)/(current vehicle kilometres) - Cost per peak vehicle: (current peak vehicle-related costs)/(current peak vehicles). These unit costs are different from the unit costs that would result by dividing the total current costs by the current level of each of the cost drivers.
10: M A Cundill and P F Watts Bus Boarding and Alighting Times TRRL Report 521, 1973.
11: Insititute for Transport Studies Achieving Best Value for Public Support in the Bus Industry - Final Report to LEK and CfIT (Annex 2) 2002.
12: Given the total number of passengers and the total capacity of each bus, an assumption in regard to average journey length is required to calculate the average load factor. Without detailed surveys, the average journey length cannot be estimated in great detail (although bus operators tend to have abroad idea). However, the fact that the relief penalty is based on the ratio of modelled to current load factor means that the model is largely insensitive to the assumed average journey length.
13: An alternative would have been to introduce a conditional function that only imposes penalties if the ratio of modelled to current load factor exceeds a certain value. However, this would have made the optimisation results considerably less stable. The consequence is that relief costs penalty can be (slightly) negative if the modelled load factor is lower than at present.

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